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ABSTRACT—There is no such thing as corporate family law. But there are
corporate families, and corporate families fight. What happens when
corporate family members fight and the conflict is so severe that one or
more of the parties wants out of the corporate relationship? Corporate law
provides some solutions, but they are shaped by the assumption that all
parties will bargain effectively for protections when seeking to exit a
corporate relationship. Under this theory, family business is, after all, just
business. The problem with this assumption is that corporate family
members do not bargain the way that corporate law expects. Corporate
family members are idiosyncratic bargainers who operate from a position
of bounded rationality and self-interest. Consequently, they are unlikely to
take steps to protect themselves against corporate oppression. The result is
a mismatch between corporate law and its underlying assumptions for a
substantial swath of family business owners who are subject to corporate
law and corporate oppression. Thus far, lawmakers have not looked to
family law to solve this problem. This Article argues that they should.
Family wealth laws—divorce and inheritance—offer an alternate model of
asset allocation at the end of a relationship, providing robust financial
protections for parties who are vulnerable in light of their idiosyncratic
bargaining position. Such laws provide the theoretical foundation for a
more realistic and fair conception of protection for corporate family
members subject to corporate oppression. There may be no such thing as
corporate family law, but there should be.
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Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its
own way.
—Leo Tolstoy †

We sense that Tolsto[y] was less familiar with the American modern
law of closely-held corporations . . . where the survival of a business
association is so perilously tied to the continuing vitality of intimate
personal relationships.
—Judge Gerald J. Weber ‡

INTRODUCTION
There is no such thing as corporate family law. But there are corporate
families, 1 and corporate families fight. Siblings undermine one another in

†

LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Constance Garnett trans., Random House 1939) (1877).
Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1550 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff’d, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986)
(mem.), and aff’d sub nom. Appeal of Orchard, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986) (mem.).
1
In this Article, I use the term corporate families to denote and discuss family-owned corporations
that are closely held. A closely held corporation is a business organization typified by a small number
of stockholders, the absence of a market for its stock, and substantial shareholder participation in the
management of the corporation. The majority of closely held corporations are family businesses. See
Robert T. Kleiman, updated by Laurie Collier Hillstrom, Closely Held Corporations, REFERENCE FOR
BUS.
(2017),
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Clo-Con/Closely-HeldCorporations.html [https://perma.cc/UP4D-5RAC] (“Most—but not all—closely held firms are
also family-owned businesses.”). Many family businesses are also, however, organized as partnerships
or LLCs or in other noncorporate ways. I do not address these forms of organization in this Article but
leave it for examination elsewhere. Moreover, I coin the term corporate families to focus on the fact
‡
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board meetings, children fire their parents, and warring parties use their
corporate power to vindicate intergenerational feuds.2 What happens when
the fighting is so ruthless that it becomes corporate oppression and one or
more of the family members want out of the corporate relationship? The
question has vexed even the United States Supreme Court, and as the
Justices in Hobby Lobby 3 recently recognized, there is no easy answer.
Corporate law provides some solutions to the problem of exit in the
face of corporate oppression. 4 Most obviously, an individual family
member can sell her shares as long as she can find a purchaser. The
problem is that most family business shares have no market value because
the companies are not publically traded, and in addition, family business
shares often come with transfer restrictions. 5 Alternatively, most state
corporate laws accord certain rights and remedies to minority shareholders
in closely held corporations who are being oppressed and have no real exit
that family relationships are negotiated through the corporation, as opposed to using the more common
term family corporations, in which family is merely a modifier and not the conceptual core.
2
The frequency of infighting in family businesses has not been quantified. Many commentators
suggest that the risk of corporate family conflict is high. Because family businesses ask individuals to
“span multiple social categories . . . . tensions are particularly endemic to [these] businesses.” David
Whetten et al., Organizational Identity and Family Business, in SAGE, THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
FAMILY BUSINESS 480, 484 (Leif Melin et al. eds., 2014). Commentators also note that “when it does
break out, the fighting tends to be more intense.” Josh Baron & Rob Lachenauer, Why Fights Erupt in
Family Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jul. 9, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/07/why-fights-erupt-in-familybus [https://perma.cc/BW2Q-F5QT]. Corporate family disputes are more intense, some authors
speculate, “because they can [be]. In nonfamily businesses, there are barriers to keep things from
escalating. Owning the business removes many of these barriers. Once a conflict starts, it can easily
spiral out of control.” Id.; see also D’Lisa McKee et al., Conflicts in Family Firms: The Good and the
Bad, in SAGE, supra, at 514, 514 (“Conflict can be particularly taxing as family entanglements worsen
stressful situations . . . . Overlapping family and business relationships may complicate how firms are
managed and potentially increase the intensity and frequency of conflicts.” (citations omitted)).
3
The question was posed in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., and Justice Ginsburg, in her
dissent, remarked: “[T]he Court [does not] offer any instruction on how to resolve the disputes that may
crop up among corporate owners over religious values and accommodations.” 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797
n.19 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority opinion noted this concern but left the question of
corporate family conflict unanswered. Id. at 2774 (majority opinion) (“HHS and the principal dissent
express concern about the possibility of disputes among the owners of corporations . . . .”). The Court
concluded: “The companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each owned and
controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious
beliefs.” Id.
4
Shareholder oppression, discussed further infra pp. 9−21, involves the majority shareholder(s) in
a closely held corporation blocking the minority from having any real voice in corporate governance or
extracting any value from their shares.
5
The majority of family businesses organized in the corporate form are closely held. Robert T.
Kleiman, updated by Laurie Collier Hillstrom, supra note 1. In this Article, I discuss this significant
subset of closely held corporations. There are some publicly traded corporations that are family
controlled; however, this is a small percentage of family businesses, and minority shareholder
oppression is not a problem in these companies because shares are publicly valued and traded and,
consequently, a minority shareholder can sell her shares for fair market value.
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options. 6 The standard for what constitutes corporate oppression is,
however, far from clear, and relief is not at all guaranteed. This lack of
robust legal protections for minority shareholders is not an oversight.
Corporate law protections are purposefully limited because corporate law is
grounded in the expectation that parties will bargain efficiently and seek to
maximize their own benefit.7 Corporate law presupposes rational actors
making rational choices, and consequently places the responsibility for
self-protection squarely on the individual.8
Many times this set of rules and assumptions makes sense, particularly
when it comes to those bargaining for and purchasing stock in public
companies on the open market. These rules do not make sense when it
comes to corporate families. Corporate family members do not bargain in
the way that laws and norms expect them to bargain. From the outset,
corporate family members—siblings, cousins, parents, and nephews and
nieces—do not generally bargain to obtain the shares they possess. Rather,
they inherit them or receive them as gifts. In addition, corporate family
members are not the classic rational actors that corporate law and economic
theory expect them to be. Corporate family members are, as behavioral
economists understand, “bounded” 9 rational actors who are enmeshed in a
complex set of interlocking relationships that intertwine the personal with
the professional. 10 First, corporate family members operate from a position

6

See discussion infra Section III.B for examples of the kinds of protections afforded by various
state laws.
7
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 830 (2002) (“[P]arties
who want liberal dissolution rights may bargain for them . . . before investing.”). For further discussion
about the norms that inform corporate law, see infra Section I.B., pp. 22–23.
8
For examples of economists who propound rational choice theory, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 3–4 (5th ed. 1998); Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking
at Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385 (1993).
9
I use the term bounded as it is used in the behavioral economics literature, to indicate the limits of
an individual’s rational choice and agency. See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Inductive Reasoning and
Bounded Rationality, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 406, 406 (1994) (“The type of rationality assumed in
economics—perfect, logical, deductive rationality—is extremely useful in generating solutions to
theoretical problems. But it demands much of human behavior, much more in fact than it can usually
deliver.”); John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669, 692 (1996)
(“Psychology and economics provide wide-ranging evidence that bounded rationality is
important . . . .”); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449 (2003) (“[R]ational models are psychologically
unrealistic.”).
10
In this way, corporate family members exemplify aspects of behavioral law and economics,
acting in ways that rational choice theory does not expect. For a sampling of behavioral law and
economics, see Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
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of bounded rationality, impacted by personal tensions, desires, and
loyalties. That is to say, corporate family members do not act in the way
that corporate law expects them to act because, as one court remarked,
“many lawsuits arising from disputes among shareholders in closely-held
corporations are characterized by the parties’ inability to separate the
business and personal aspects of their relationship.”11 In addition, corporate
family members also operate from a position of bounded self-interest: they
are idiosyncratic bargainers who may prioritize values over profits and
family legacy over maximal efficiency. 12
That corporate family members are treated like any other business coowners and do not receive many financial protections in the face of
corporate oppression is consequently problematic. And it is no small
matter. Family businesses are ubiquitous in the United States and are often
described as “the backbone” of the American economy. 13 These enterprises
predominate in the marketplace, 14 constituting approximately 80% of
business enterprises in the United States, 15 employing 60% of workers, and
creating 78% of new jobs. 16 Family businesses have been a staple of
American capitalism—just as entrepreneurialism has been a decidedly
11

Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1550 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff’d, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986)
(mem.), and aff’d sub nom. Appeal of Orchard, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986) (mem.).
12
Behavioralists might argue that all corporate actors are bounded in these same ways and that the
classical idea of the rational actor is normatively flawed across the board. I would agree with that
assertion, but I argue here that family members are even more “bounded” in their bargaining than other
actors. Family businesses, as the business literature describes, are hybrid-identity organizations that
require corporate stakeholders to negotiate not only workplace conflict but also social-role confusion.
Ritch L. Sorenson, Values in Family Business, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY BUSINESS, supra
note 2, at 463, 472. Corporate family members are therefore called upon to exercise extra measures of
care, diplomacy, and sensitivity as they go about the work of the corporation. As they well know,
“family problems can become business problems, and business disagreements can further sour family
relations.” Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185,
1212–13 (2013) [hereinafter Means, Nonmarket Values].
13
ANDREA COLLI, THE HISTORY OF FAMILY BUSINESS, 1850–2000 8 (2003); Family Business
Facts, CONWAY CTR. FOR FAM. BUS., http://www.familybusinesscenter.com/resources/family-businessfacts [https://perma.cc/Y7NM-TXBY].
14
See Benjamin Means, The Contractual Foundation of Family-Business Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J.
675, 676 (2014) [hereinafter Means, The Contractual Foundation] (“Most U.S. businesses are family
owned . . . .”); see also Joseph H. Astrachan & Melissa Carey Shanker, Family Businesses’
Contribution to the U.S. Economy: A Closer Look, 16 FAM. BUS. REV. 211, 216 (2003) (finding that,
according to the broadest definition of family business, 89% of businesses in the United States are
family businesses).
15
See DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISES 274 (4th ed. 2013)
(stating that over 80% of business enterprises in the United States are family owned).
16
MATTHEW R. MARVEL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW VENTURE MANAGEMENT 190 (2012). See
generally Benjamin Means, Wealth Inequality and Family Businesses, 65 EMORY L.J. 937 (2016)
[hereinafter Means, Wealth Inequality] (suggesting that family businesses may disrupt entrenched
hierarchies and create opportunities for many ethnic communities).
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American value—since colonial America. 17 Small producers of craft
products are predominantly family businesses, but many family-owned or
controlled companies are also “economic powerhouses.” 18 In fact,
approximately “35 percent of Fortune 500 companies are familycontrolled” 19 and major companies such as Cargill and Hobby Lobby are
family-owned and controlled. 20 In short, the problem of family members
exiting in the face of corporate oppression is one worth fixing.
Fortunately, models for treating corporate partners differently on the
basis of their familial ties already exist for a subset of corporate family
members: corporate spouses. When corporate spouses encounter severe
conflict and seek exit, they have options in family law. 21 Divorce and
inheritance law both offer models of asset allocation at relationship
termination that differ from the traditional corporate law model. An
unhappy spouse looking to leave the corporate relationship can always
pursue a divorce. And through the equitable division of the marital estate, a
corporate spouse can receive up to half of the couple’s corporate assets.22
Likewise, if one spouse tries to disinherit the other, the surviving spouse
can still receive a substantial share of the deceased spouse’s estate.
Through intestacy rights or by electing to take the forced spousal share, the
surviving spouse could receive between a third and a half of the deceased
spouse’s assets, including corporate assets. 23 Unlike other corporate family

17

See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of Family Firms in the United States, 1 FAM. BUS.
REV. 51, 60–61 (1988).
18
See, e.g., America’s Largest Private Companies: #2 Koch Industries, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2008,
6:00
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/21/privates08_Koch-Industries_VMZQ.html
[https://perma.cc/T232-3QD3]; Our History, MARS (2017), http://www.mars.com/global/aboutus/history [https://perma.cc/W4QJ-T3N2 ] (explaining that Mars is still family owned but the leadership
team is currently composed of nonfamily members).
19
CONWAY CTR. FOR FAM. BUS., supra note 13.
20
As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Hobby Lobby dissent:
“Closely held” is not synonymous with “small.” Hobby Lobby is hardly the only enterprise of
sizable scale that is family owned or closely held. For example, the family-owned candy giant
Mars, Inc., takes in $33 billion in revenues and has some 72,000 employees, and closely held
Cargill, Inc., takes in more than $136 billion in revenues and employs some 140,000 persons.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 n.19 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see
also Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the “Little Guy” Myth in Legal Definitions, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1041, 1090–91 (2013) (explaining that the term small in the context of firm size, is not defined by its
common usage and is instead used to describe larger, more powerful firms). According to one study,
“[c]lose corporations account for most of American business” and “[f]amily-owned businesses alone
represent ninety-five percent of all United States businesses.” Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder
Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 287 (1990).
21
I use family law in this Article to encompass both divorce and inheritance law. This may, more
technically, be family wealth law because it draws inheritance into the family law domain.
22
See discussion of corporate assets and equitable distribution infra Section 2.A.
23
See discussion of corporate assets, intestacy, and elective share rules infra Section 2.B.
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members, corporate spouses receive this privileged treatment based on their
presumed inability to bargain at arm’s length as well as the presence of a
default marital bargain. 24 And while the marital relationship is certainly
exceptional in many ways, the ways in which personal feelings can impact
bargaining is not necessarily unique to spouses. Other corporate family
members are bounded or impaired bargainers in the same way, and they,
mistakenly, do not benefit from the presumption of idiosyncratic
bargaining. 25
In light of how ubiquitous the family business is and the impact of
these businesses on the economy, it is somewhat surprising that legal
scholars have paid little attention to the legal problems of corporate
families. 26 The work that has been done has addressed corporate law and
family law in isolation. Corporate law scholars have addressed minority
shareholder oppression in closely held corporations. 27 Business scholars
have studied the subject, writing case studies about family businesses28 and
investigating questions such as whether business outcomes are better or
worse in family-run enterprises. 29 Family law scholars have, for their part,
24

Marriage law bases its protections on twin assumptions: a spouse’s inability to explicitly bargain
coupled with the acceptance of an implicit bargain. The implicit marital bargain is based on coverture
rules and is an exchange of financial support for domestic care.
25
It may be that all corporate parties are impaired bargainers, taking behavioral theory seriously. In
addition, there may be other corporate parties who are especially bounded bargainers—friends who start
businesses together, in particular. However, family members are the most obviously impacted by the
overlap between personal and corporate roles just as they are also the easiest group to define and
delimit. A next step, for consideration outside of this Article but based on the concepts introduced
herein, might be to consider the law of “corporate friends.”
26
Means, The Contractual Foundation, supra note 14, at 676–77; see also COLLI, supra note 13, at
73 (“[D]espite the relevance of the subject, there is a surprising lack of theoretical, economic
research . . . .”).
27
See, e.g., Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations: Oppression,
Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371 (2003); Douglas K. Moll,
Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close Corporation, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841
(2003) [hereinafter Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy]; Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder
Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation,
54 DUKE L.J. 293 (2004) [hereinafter Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,”]; Samuel E.
Neschis, Reasonable Expectations of Shareholder-Employees in Closely Held Corporations: Towards a
Standard of When Termination of Employment Constitutes Shareholder Oppression, 13 DEPAUL BUS.
& COM. L.J. 301 (2015).
28
See, e.g., Francesco Chirico, Knowledge Accumulation in Family Firms: Evidence from Four
Case Studies, 26 INT’L SMALL BUS. J. 433 (2008); Bart J. Debicki et al., Family Business Research in
the New Millennium: An Overview of the Who, the Where, the What, and the Why, 22 FAM. BUS. REV.
151 (2009); A. B. Ibrahim et al., A Study of Succession in a Family Firm, 14 FAM. BUS. REV. 245
(2001); Pramodita Sharma, An Overview of the Field of Family Business Studies: Current Status and
Directions for the Future, 17 FAM. BUS. REV. 1 (2004).
29
See, e.g., Timothy G. Habbershon & Mary L. Williams, A Resource-Based Framework for
Assessing the Strategic Advantages of Family Firms, 12 FAM. BUS. REV. 1 (1999); Danny Miller et al.,
Stewardship vs. Stagnation: An Empirical Comparison of Small Family and Non-Family Businesses,
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pressed on the analogy between corporate and marital relationships as a
way of better understanding spousal rights and responsibilities, particularly
at divorce. 30 Few legal scholars, however, have addressed the entwinement
of family relations with corporate ownership and governance. 31 This
analysis therefore not only fills a gap but also builds a new bridge between
corporate and family law scholarship.
This Article, then, examines the bargaining norms that shape both
corporate law and family law and proposes that these norms be recalibrated
in such a way as to provide increased financial protections for vulnerable
corporate family members. The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I
discusses minority shareholder oppression and shows how corporate family
members are particularly vulnerable to classic techniques of corporate
oppression. Part I also offers an analysis of bargaining norms underlying
corporate law and demonstrates why they are inappropriate when applied to
corporate family members. Part II turns to family law and sets forth not
only the rules for corporate spouses but also how and why these particular
corporate family members receive relatively robust protections. Part III
proposes several paths toward creating a new domain of corporate family
law. Part III suggests several ways in which family law models solutions
and offers ideas for statutory reform. At the moment, there is no such thing
as corporate family law. But we can and should build it.
I.

CORPORATE OPPRESSION AND BARGAINING

Corporate law and corporate governance rules provide a limited
means of conflict resolution within a family business. This Section
analyzes the legal framework of minority shareholder oppression as well as
the norms that inform the basic judicial approach to corporate oppression
claims. Using recent minority shareholder oppression cases, I emphasize
why current protections are insufficient to protect corporate family
members. I also explain why the bargaining norms that undergird the
corporate law framework are misapplied in the case of corporate families,
45 J. MGMT. STUD. 51 (2008); Andy Yu et al., The Landscape of Family Business Outcomes: A
Summary and Numerical Taxonomy of Dependent Variables, 25 FAM. BUS. REV. 33 (2012 ).
30
See, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUBLED TRAJECTORY OF
U.S. ALIMONY LAW (2014); Mary Anne Case, Lecture, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758
(2005); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001).
31
For notable exceptions, see Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder
Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161 (2010) [hereinafter Means, A Contractual Approach];
Means, Nonmarket Values, supra note 12; Means, The Contractual Foundation, supra note 14; Means,
Wealth Inequality, supra note 16. Means is also critical of applying the rational actor model to family
business members and proposes private ordering and contractual solutions that turn on good faith and
fair dealing as well as shared understandings of family business values.
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jeopardizing the ability of corporate family members to extract any value
from their shares in the family business, thereby impairing their ability to
exit a corporate relationship.
A. No Exit? The Plight of the Minority Shareholder
Corporate families can fight about corporate strategy, board
composition, payment of bonuses, advertisement campaigns, and office
space. Frequently, these disputes within a family business are intertwined
with the minority shareholder status of one party. Minority shareholder
status generates conflict and creates problematic results because the
minority party will always be overruled or outvoted. Minority shareholders
are consequently subject to oppression and mistreatment at the hands of the
majority shareholder, and conflicts cannot be resolved through shareholder
voting or board reorganization. 32 This Section explores the legal
background for minority shareholder oppression, the few and insufficient
remedies that are available, and why the existing framework is particularly
bad for corporate family members.
1. The Classic Corporate Oppression Framework
Minority shareholder oppression is, as we will see, notoriously
difficult to define. Compounding the problem, a minority stakeholder lacks
not only agency within the corporation but also a practical way to exit the
corporation. 33 Because a minority stakeholder’s shares do not have a
market value, the most likely purchaser is the majority shareholder. The
majority shareholder can, consequently, force the minority shareholder into
accepting a low price for the shares unless she wants to be “locked into”
the corporation. Furthermore, even if the shareholder found another buyer

32
Elizabeth Pollman states that Hobby Lobby is similarly silent on how these mechanisms might
work (or not work): “The separate roles of the board and the shareholders inevitably lead to the question
of whether the board has the power to determine a religious purpose for the corporation.” Elizabeth
Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
149, 166 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016). Likewise, “[i]f shareholder consent is sufficient or
required for determining the religious purpose of the corporation, must it be unanimous? Again, we face
a question not as readily answered as the Court suggested.” Id.
33
Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder
Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1217 (2009) [hereinafter Means, A VoiceBased Framework] (“[M]inority shareholder oppression in close corporations turns on one critical fact:
minority shareholders have no practical ability to sell their shares and exit without the majority’s
consent.”). See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4–5 (1970) (identifying economic pressure (exit)
and political influence (voice) as the two primary mechanisms a firm’s members or customers may have
available to protect their interests).
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willing to accept a minority stake, transfer restrictions often apply. 34 The
result of this oppression is that the minority shareholder in a closely held
corporation is in a position that is “as unique as it is precarious” because
she is subject to the “dual hazards of a complete loss of liquidity and an
indefinite exclusion from sharing in the profitability of the firm.” 35
Faced with oppressive actions and a vulnerable position, minority
shareholders do have some legal rights and remedies. However, while
virtually all states, with the notable exception of Delaware, offer some kind
of statutory or common law protection for oppressed minority
shareholders, 36 the protections that do exist are far from uniform or robust.
Instead, protections across states are “[a] true legislative and judicial
patchwork.” 37 Moreover, “[t]he current panoply of claims and relief does
not efficiently address the underlying problems of majority power and
minority illiquidity in the closely held business.” 38
A number of state statutes enforce a heightened fiduciary duty39 for
the majority shareholder in a closely held corporation. In a classic case
interpreting these fiduciary duties, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court sided with the minority shareholder in concluding that “stockholders
in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary
duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another,” 40
namely utmost good faith. Shareholders in a close corporation, the court
remarked, were more akin to partners because of “the trust and confidence
which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the inherent

34
“[B]ecause of the close personal relationship that characterizes the closely held business, the
participants often affirmatively restrict who can join the enterprise in order to avoid being stuck in an
intimate relationship with someone with whom they are not compatible.” Robert B. Thompson,
Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 196 (1988)
[hereinafter Thompson, Corporate Dissolution].
35
J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977).
36
For more about the statutory landscape, see infra Section III.B.2.
37
John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppression in the
Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 661 (2007) (“Each state has a unique regime for
addressing minority shareholder oppression in closely held businesses—a surprising state of affairs for
such an important area of corporate law.”).
38
Id. at 690.
39
A number of state courts “have imposed an enhanced fiduciary duty between close corporation
shareholders and have allowed an oppressed shareholder to bring a direct cause of action for breach of
this duty.” Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy, supra note 27, at 851. These states
include Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Matheson & Maler, supra note 37, at 664,
700 app.
40
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (footnotes omitted).
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danger to minority interests in the close corporation.”41 However, defining
the type of heightened fiduciary duty and when it is breached has posed
problems for courts faced with the question. In addition, courts are
deferential to corporate decisionmakers, and the primacy of the business
judgment rulea presumption that a corporate decisionmaker acted in
good faith and fair dealingworks against minority plaintiffs. 42
Instead of heightened fiduciary duty, other states provide relief for a
minority shareholder when her reasonable expectations are violated.43
Using the reasonable expectations approach, “corporate decisions may be
found oppressive because they violate the expectations that the minority
reasonably maintained toward employment, remuneration, or control.”44
One benefit of this approach is that it is more flexible and allows courts to
analyze expectations contextually. For example, “shareholder relationships
in a family corporation may be quite different than those in a venture
capital-funded start up.” 45 Like with heightened fiduciary duty, the majority
shareholder “owes additional duties to the minority,” 46 but under the
reasonable expectations rubric, “those duties are defined by an account of
what it is reasonable for the minority to expect from the majority.” 47
41
Id. A number of corporate family cases involve fiduciary duty in the trust law context when
corporate shares are held in trust. See, e.g., Collins v. Nugent, 443 N.E.2d 277, 284−89 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982) (discussing fiduciary relationship between trust beneficiary and her half brother in case involving
family-owned business); Jennings v. Murdock, 553 P.2d 846, 870–71 (Kan. 1976) (finding that
institutional trustee did not breach its fiduciary duty by failing to restrain a cotrustee from urging the
sale of family newspaper business, even though the purpose of the trust was to keep the newspaper in
the family). The fiduciary duty analysis in the trust law context is similar to the analysis in this
heightened fiduciary duty context. Moreover, a number of trust law cases explore what the appropriate
fiduciary duty standard is in these scenarios. See, e.g., Copley v. Copley, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842, 864 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981) (“[A] trustee generally is duty-bound to exercise such care and diligence as a person of
ordinary prudence would exercise.” (citations omitted)). For additional discussion of fiduciary duty
standards in trust law, see infra Section III.B.2.
42
See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
43
A 2007 survey found that twenty states applied the reasonable expectations standard and one
additional state used reasonable expectations as a factor in assessing corporate oppression. Matheson &
Maler, supra note 37, at 664, 700 app. (see appendix for grid and survey of state law).
44
Art, supra note 27, at 373.
45
Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 33, at 1227.
46
Id.
47
Id. “In short, then, the ‘rights or interests’ of a shareholder in any given case will not necessarily
be the same ‘rights or interests’ of any other shareholder.” Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551,
563 (N.C. 1983). In Meiselman, the court held:
[A] trial court is: (1) to define the “rights or interests” the complaining shareholder has in the
corporation; and (2) to determine whether some form of relief is “reasonably necessary” for the
protection of those “rights or interests[.”] For plaintiff to obtain relief under the expectations
analysis, he must prove that (1) he had one or more substantial reasonable expectations known or
assumed by the other participants; (2) the expectation has been frustrated; (3) the frustration was
without fault of plaintiff and was in large part beyond his control; and (4) under all of the
circumstances of the case plaintiff is entitled to some form of equitable relief.
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The problem with these statutes is that the reasonable expectations
approach “does not necessarily require strong protection of minority
shareholders.” 48 Interpretive leeway can and has led to great variability
across the states, jeopardizing the minimal protection afforded to the
minority shareholder. Moreover, courts also state an obligation to take into
account the reasonable expectations of the majority shareholder. As the
New Jersey Supreme Court observed: “The statute not only protects the
minority stockholder, but I view it also as a protection, as well, perhaps not
intentionally drawn, for the majority.” 49
And then there’s Delaware. Most notably, Delaware courts do not
enforce a higher fiduciary duty or reasonable expectations framework.
Instead, they deploy general corporate law principles and rely on “entire
fairness as a means of protecting minority stockholders.” 50 Delaware courts
have declined to offer more protection, suggesting that it is the
responsibility of the stockholder (or purchaser) to bargain for protections
before acquiring closely held stock: “[A] stockholder intending to buy into
a minority position in a Delaware corporation may enter into definitive
stockholder agreements, and such agreements may provide for elaborate
earnings tests, buyout provisions, voting trusts, or other voting
agreements.” 51
The bargaining expectation precludes legal remedies in the absence of
self-dealing or any other similarly conflicted transaction on the part of the
majority shareholder.
Accordingly, a minority shareholder is not totally without recourse.
However, as a Pennsylvania court remarked: “We find ourselves struck by
the unavailability or inadequacy of identifiable legal remedies to aid
minority shareholders in redressing abuses by majority shareholders
equipped with unfettered power over the management of the close
corporation.” 52 Shareholder options are limited by state statutory rules,
judicial deference to the business judgment rule, and a related judicial
resistance to reading oppression statues expansively. In addition, looking to
Delaware, states like Oklahoma also offer no protection, expecting the
parties to bargain and safeguarding contractual autonomy. None of these

Id. at 564.
48
Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 33, at 1227.
49
Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1024 (N.J. 1993).
50
Blaustein v. Lord Baltimore Capital Corp., C.A. No. 6685-VCN, 2013 WL 1810956, at *14 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 30, 2013), aff’d, 84 A.3d 954 (Del. 2014).
51
Id. at *15.
52
Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1550 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff’d, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986)
(mem.), and aff’d sub nom. Appeal of Orchard, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986) (mem.).
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options for minority shareholders take into account the deeply difficult
position of the oppressed corporate family member and they overestimate
the capacity and inclination of these individuals to bargain for protections.
2. Freezing and Squeezing out Family Members
While minority shareholder oppression may be difficult to define,
there are nonetheless hallmark indicators of oppression in family
businesses. Majority shareholders use a range of common techniques to
“freeze” or “squeeze” out the minority party, including “the refusal to
declare dividends, the termination of a minority shareholder’s employment,
the removal of a minority shareholder from a position of management, and
the siphoning off of corporate earnings through high compensation to the
majority shareholder.” 53 These are “devastatingly effective” 54 techniques
that strip minority shareholders of their role, voice, and even income. 55 This
Section analyzes how these cases arise in family businesses and how courts
treat them. I focus on the obstacles that minority shareholders face when
pressing their claims of corporate oppression and, ultimately, the absence
of real remedies for these corporate family members seeking to exit the
corporation.
a. Challenging the Failure to Pay Dividends
The decision to withhold the payment of dividends in a closely held
corporation can be a significant action because the retention and
reinvestment of company profits means that a minority shareholder in a
family business loses her ability to profit from or even just capture the
value of her shares.56 Consequently, “[f]or the minority shareholder to
receive a return on investment . . . dividends are needed, as capital

53
Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy, supra note 27, at 848; see also F. Hodge
O’Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121,
121 (1987) (“Minority shareholders frequently are deprived of any income from the corporations, either
in the form of dividends or salary; they are not allowed any effective voice in business decisions; and
they are denied any information about corporate affairs.”).
54
O’Neal, supra note 53, at 126.
Thus, in a close corporation, the minority stockholders may be trapped in a disadvantageous
situation. No outsider would knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority. The
outsider would have the same difficulties. To cut losses, the minority stockholder may be
compelled to deal with the majority. This is the capstone of the majority plan. Majority “freezeout” schemes which withhold dividends are designed to compel the minority to relinquish stock at
inadequate prices.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975).
55
Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 33, at 1208 (“Investing in a closely held
corporation is a risky proposition unless you hold the controlling stake or have bargained for additional
protections. Your investment is likely to be a large percentage of your total wealth, and, although you
may rely upon family relationships or friendships, those are not legal protections.” (footnote omitted)).
56
Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy, supra note 27, at 860.
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appreciation is difficult (if not impossible) to realize.”57 The importance of
dividends in this context may decrease if all shareholders are salaried
employees of the company; 58 however, the payment of dividends remains
an important output of compensation for shareholders. Withholding
dividends is, therefore, a simple way to put “great pressure on minority
shareholders pressed for funds.” 59
The issue for minority shareholders faced with this problem is that
“many courts apparently feel that there is a legitimate sphere in which the
controlling [directors or] shareholders can act in their own interest even if
the minority suffers.” 60 The primacy and entrenchment of the business
judgment rule works against the minority interest. 61 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in a leading fiduciary duty case, pointed to this
problem, stating: “[C]ourts fairly consistently have been disinclined to
interfere in those facets of internal corporate operations, such as the
selection and retention or dismissal of officers, directors and employees,
which essentially involve management decisions subject to the principle of
majority control.” 62 That is to say, if majority shareholders can articulate a
legitimate business reason for the failure to pay dividends, then the
minority shareholder’s claim is likely to fail.
In an exemplary case, Davis v. Brockamp & Jaeger, Inc., 63 the Oregon
Court of Appeals held that the defendant was not liable for majority
oppression in a case about bonuses because he was able to advance a
legitimate business purpose. Two friends, Brockamp and Jaeger, started a
construction company (BJI) in 1985, and shares in that company eventually
passed to Jaeger’s sons and also son-in-law, who eventually became the

57

Id.
“It is generally acknowledged that, in close corporations, shareholders often work for the
corporation, and corporate dividends are often paid in the form of a salary.” Franchino v. Franchino,
687 N.W.2d 620, 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
59
O’Neal, supra note 53, at 125.
60
Id.; see also Comment, Minority Rights and the Corporate “Squeeze” and “Freeze,”
1959 DUKE L.J. 436, 437 (1959).
61
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 559 (N.C. 1983) (“‘[T]wo principal conceptualistic
barriers to the courts’ granting relief to aggrieved shareholders’ in such a situation are: ‘(1) the principle
of majority rule in corporate management and (2) the business judgment rule.’” (quoting F. O’NEAL,
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 9.04, at 582 (1975))).
62
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976).
63
174 P.3d 607, 609 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (“BJI is a construction company founded by John
Brockamp and Roy Jaeger, who were initially the sole shareholders. In 1985, defendant, who was a
company employee, became a shareholder. At that time, each of the three shareholders owned 50
shares, and all three served as corporate directors. Brockamp retired in 1993 and sold his shares to BJI.
On several occasions thereafter, Roy Jaeger gave some of his shares to his sons, Craig and Chris, and to
plaintiff, who is Roy Jaeger’s son-in-law . . . .”).
58
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plaintiff in the case. 64 The son-in-law’s claim against the company65
centered on the relative amounts of bonuses distributed annually in lieu of
dividends. The court observed: “Given that all of its shareholders were also
employees, BJI distributed its profits as annual bonuses, rather than
dividends, in order to reduce the company’s tax liability.” 66 Tax planning
was, according to the court, a perfectly legitimate business reason for
choosing to give bonuses rather than dividends.
When the two original partners had been working, the bonuses had
been relatively equivalent. However, after the one partner departed, the
other partner began to calculate bonuses based on determination of
individual contribution, as assessed by him. According to this system, in
2000 the plaintiff received $131,325 as a bonus and the defendant received
$934,267 or, as the court noted, 7.1 times the amount of plaintiff’s bonus. 67
Two years later, using the same contribution theory, the plaintiff’s
contributions earned him a bonus of $20,000 while the defendant took
home $525,00026.3 times the amount of plaintiff’s bonus.68 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the plaintiff quit and thereafter filed a suit, claiming
minority shareholder oppression, among other things.
At trial, witnesses established that the defendant majority shareholder
had terminated the weekly management meeting as well as annual
shareholder meetings. The plaintiff claimed that it was the defendant who
had problems getting along with the others, stating: “[T]he meetings just
weren’t really productive anymore because nobody, you know—they
couldn’t agree with [defendant]. And so [defendant] just canceled them or
he wouldn’t show up and we would arbitrarily cancel.” 69 The defendant
himself admitted that he had stopped having meetings because the son-inlaw “didn’t get along very well” with his brothers-in-law. 70 In addition, one
of the minority shareholders who had resigned and, in exchange, succeeded
in redeeming his shares testified that “the minority shareholders were
dissatisfied with the level of control they had over the company and that
‘the majority’ of the minority shareholders felt that they did not have a
voice in the company.” 71
64

Id.
At the time that the son-in-law made his claim, the company was being run by a former
employee, Terry Greenman, who had obtained shares while Jaeger and Brockamp were still running the
company.
66
Id. at 610.
67
Id. at 611.
68
Id. at 612.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. (footnote omitted).
65
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Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision
that there was no oppression, remarking: “[A] majority shareholder’s
fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing are discharged if the
majority’s decisions are ‘made in good faith and reflect[ ] legitimate
business purposes rather than the private interests of those in control.’” 72
Accordingly, under a good faith analysis, the court concluded “that the
bonuses that defendant paid reflected a legitimate business purpose—
namely, creating incentive for the shareholders to increase BJI’s
profitability.” 73 The minority shareholder had no recourse because of the
application of the business judgment rule in the context of shareholder
oppression.
Freezing out a minority shareholder by the refusal to pay dividends is,
therefore, a relatively simple tactic as long as the majority shareholder can
present the court with someanylegitimate business purpose.
b. You’re Fired! 74 Termination as Oppression
Another common squeeze-out technique is the termination of a
minority shareholder’s employment. Termination is a frequently deployed
technique in family businesses because “shareholders in close corporations
are often members of the corporation’s management.” 75 Moreover,
employment termination in these companies is especially injurious because
“[i]t is generally acknowledged that, in close corporations, shareholders
often work for the corporation, and corporate dividends are often paid in
the form of a salary.” 76 Accordingly, if the minority shareholder does not
hold a position in the company, the majority might choose to withhold
dividends. If, on the other hand, the minority shareholder holds a paid
position, the majority may be likely to choose employment termination.
The problems confronting a terminated family employee trying to
prevail on an oppression claim, however, are numerous. As with failure to
pay dividends, legitimate business reasons may justify termination of
employment. Furthermore, if an employee does not have a contract that
explicitly states the terms of employment, any employment is usually
considered to be at will. Finally, courts sometimes throw out employment
termination claims in the context of shareholder oppression because

72

Id. at 615 (citing Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Or. 1977)).
Id.
74
See Holly Hillis, Donald Trump “You’re Fired,” YOUTUBE (May
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75SEy1qu71I [https://perma.cc/2JRW-WTW6].
75
Franchino v. Franchino, 687 N.W.2d 620, 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
76
Id.
73
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“employment and board membership are not generally listed among rights
that automatically accrue to shareholders.”77
To begin with, any claim of minority shareholder oppression based on
employment termination will likely fail if there is the possibility of
employee fault. In Grill v. Aversa, a case about a conflict between two
brothers-in-law who were both shareholders in a company that trained
commercial truck drivers, 78 the court was unwilling to find that one of the
brothers-in-law had been subject to minority shareholder oppression when
his employment was terminated. 79 Based on the testimony of the two men,
the court stated that the evidence permitted but did not “compel an
inference that this termination arises out of family acrimony and attempts at
shareholder oppression.” 80 However, the court added, “it is equally true that
substantial evidence was presented demonstrating that Sage was justified in
terminating Grill’s employment.” 81 If a legitimate motive coexists
alongside another, less legitimate one, then courts will generally decline to
find oppressive behavior. In these claims, then, employment law and
shareholder law intersect, reproducing the difficulties of “mixed motive”
employment cases in the oppression context.
Terminated employees also encounter difficulties because, in the
absence of a written employment agreement, most employees are
considered at-will employees. Termination without warning or cause, then,
is legally permissible, at least in the employment law context. Moreover,
even though many family members consider employment in the family
business to be a lifetime proposition, courts generally agree that lifetime
employment is not a reasonable expectation. In the case of Ford v. Ford,
for example, when a son fired his sister and mother from the family
business, a golf course, and replaced them with his own wife and son, the
court concluded that there was no oppression. 82 In their minority
shareholder oppression claims, the sister and mother stated that the son,
77

Id.
908 F. Supp. 2d 573, 593 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
79
Plaintiff filed wrongful termination and retaliatory discharge claims. Id. at 578.
80
Id. at 593.
81
Id. A plaintiff’s chance of proving retaliatory discharge is greater if the majority shareholder
cannot articulate a legitimate business reason for the termination. See Knights’ Piping, Inc. v. Knight,
123 So. 3d 451, 459 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (“Benny admitted in his testimony that he unilaterally
terminated Harold. Harold testified that Benny never gave him a reason for his termination, and Benny
has offered no legitimate business purpose for terminating Harold.”).
82
878 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“Riverview Golf Course, Inc . . . . a Pennsylvania
corporation incorporated in 1961, owns and operates the Riverview Golf Course . . . . Initially the
corporation had four shareholders, including William B. Ford (‘William’), husband of Plaintiff
Margaret B. Ford (‘Margaret’), and father of Plaintiff Margaret L. Ford (‘Peggy’) and Defendant
William K. Ford (‘Bill’).
78
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Bill, “continued to manage the corporation for his own benefit while
oppressing the minority shareholders.” 83 Using a reasonable expectations
framework to evaluate the claim, the court nevertheless determined that
“[the sister’s] expectation of lifetime employment was unreasonable, absent
an express agreement to that effect.”84
Finally, termination-as-oppression claims are challenging to win
because courts do not count employment rights as part of the package of
shareholder rights. In U.S. Eagle Corp. v. Westphal (In re U.S. Eagle
Corp.), a brother who co-owned and managed a closely held corporation
with his sister and other relatives brought a claim of improper termination
through minority shareholder oppression, seeking reinstatement.85 The
brother, Scott, had been employed as secretary and vice president of the
company starting in 2005 after a board reconfiguration and company
restructuring. 86 Despite being “Chairman of the Board and highest ranking
officer of U.S. Eagle and Vice President and Secretary of each subsidiary,”
however, he did not have an employment contract.87 Consequently, when
the board was once again configured in 2012, “the new board voted to
terminate Scott’s employment.”88
When he was fired, Scott claimed that his sister had “orchestrated” his
removal and that his termination “unjustifiably thwarted the understanding
on which [he] became and has remained a shareholder.”89 Applying
Delaware law, which offers no statutory protection for minority
shareholders, the court remarked that Scott’s termination was lawful
because the company had not modified Scott’s stock interest, reduced his
shares, or violated any of his shareholder rights.90 The court explained that:
“[A]lthough majority stockholders have fiduciary duties to minority
stockholders qua stockholder, those duties are not implicated when the
issue involves the rights of the minority stockholder qua employee under
an employment contract.” 91 Thus, despite the fact that the board had been

83

Id. at 898.
Id. at 903–04. The court did remark that “Peggy and Margaret do have a reasonable expectation
to receive some benefit from their minority shares in this profitable corporation.” Id. at 904. However,
the court left the “proper measure of this benefit” to the custodian. Id.
85
484 B.R. 640, 644 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2012).
86
Id. at 645.
87
Id. at 644.
88
Id. at 646.
89
Id. Scott also claimed that his termination “was undertaken without any opportunity to be heard,
or to discuss terms of severance.” Id. To this claim, the court responded that Scott had been an at-will
employee. Id. at 653.
90
Id.
91
Id. (quoting Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 37 (Del. 1996)).
84
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reconstituted specifically in order to vote for his termination and despite the
fact that Scott had believed there to be an understanding regarding his
continued employment, the court viewed him as ultimately nothing more
than an employee who had been terminated, rather than a shareholder
whose rights had been trampled on by the majority shareholder.
Ultimately, corporate family members who have been terminated have
little recourse in addressing adverse employment decisions. Corporate
family members can lose income, board participation, and employment
status and be left with neither the ability to profit from nor the ability to
enjoy the benefits that flow from being part of a family business.
c. Ritchie v. Rupe: Redefining “Oppressive”
In addition to recurrent problems with the judicial application of the
current shareholder oppression framework, protections for minority
shareholders may be in decline because courts are starting to define
oppressive very narrowly. The Texas Supreme Court sent this signal very
clearly in a 2014 decision.
In Ritchie v. Rupe, the Texas Supreme Court overruled both the trial
court and the appellate court to conclude that majority shareholder actions
are oppressive only when “they abuse their authority over the corporation
with the intent to harm the interests of one or more of the shareholders, in a
manner that does not comport with the honest exercise of their business
judgment, and by doing so create a serious risk of harm to the
corporation.” 92 This definition of oppressive behavior is narrow and
demanding, and it raises the bar for plaintiffs.
Ritchie v. Rupe entailed a classic blended-family conflict involving
siblings and second wives, pitting a widowed second wife against her
sister-in-law. Buddy Rupe and his sister, Paula Dennard, were two
members of the four-person board of directors of Rupe Investment
Corporation, a Texas closely held corporation.93 Ownership of 72% of the
voting stock was placed in three different family trusts and apportioned
between Buddy Rupe, Dennard, and Dennard’s children. 94 Another trust,
created by Gordon Rupethe father of Buddy Rupe and Dennardnamed
the two children, their mother, and Dennard’s three children as
beneficiaries. When Buddy Rupe married Ann Rupe in 1983 and they had a
child, the couple “wanted their son to be added as a beneficiary of

92

443 S.W.3d 856, 871 (Tex. 2014).
Id. at 860. The two other directors were family friends. Id. at 860–61. The court notes that, “A
corporation is ‘closely held’ if it has fewer than thirty-five shareholders and its stock is not publicly
traded.” Id. at 860 n.1 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.563 (2007)).
94
Id. at 860–61.
93
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Gordon’s Trust, but Dennard and her children refused, and this created
some friction between [Ann] Rupe and Dennard.” 95 Moreover, Ann Rupe
stated that Dennard treated her “‘as an outsider’ from the very beginning,
and told her that she would ‘never get any money in this family.’”96
Subsequently, Ann Rupe began to consider pursuing legal means to
reform Gordon Rupe’s trust in order to add her son as a beneficiary. 97
While Ann was still considering this action, Buddy died and his 18%
interest in the corporation passed into a trust established for the benefit of
Ann Rupe and their son, with Ann acting as trustee. Ann claimed that
Dennard and the two other trustees “immediately became ‘hostile’ towards
her and feared that she would sue to reform Gordon’s Trust.”98
Consequently, Ann sought to sell the shares held in trust.
Ann went to both of the nonfamily directors in an attempt to sell the
shares, but both men made low offers and told her that the timing was not
right. Ann then found an interested outside buyer, but the buyer wanted to
meet with the directors, who refused to meet. The directors stated that,
“because RIC would not be a party to the sale of her shares to an outside
buyer, ‘it would be inappropriate . . . to meet with your prospects or
otherwise participate in any activities relating to your proposed sale of
stock.’” 99 The buyer, however, wanted to “talk to the executives . . . as part
of their due diligence.” 100 Ann’s attorney advised her that “it would be
‘incredibly difficult’ to market [her] shares without such meetings, and the
likelihood of selling the shares was ‘zero.’” 101
Ann thereafter filed suit against Dennard and the other directors,
alleging that they “engaged in ‘oppressive’ conduct and breached fiduciary
duties to her.” 102 At trial, the jury found in Ann Rupe’s favor and the court
rendered judgment requiring the corporation to redeem her shares. 103 The
court of appeals affirmed this judgment and, using a test set forth in the
1988 case Davis v. Sheerin, 104 stated that the directors’ actions “defeated
95

Id. at 861.
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 862.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 862–63.
104
754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988). Davis v. Sheerin stated that the actions of majority
shareholders are oppressive when they either (1) substantially defeat a minority shareholder’s
reasonable expectations or (2) constitute harsh or wrongful conduct that departs from the standards of
fair dealing. Id. at 381–82.
96
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Rupe’s reasonable expectations” while also constituting a “visible
departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair play on
which each shareholder is entitled to rely.” 105
The state supreme court, however, disagreed with both lower courts,
concluding that “neither the ‘fair dealing’ test nor the ‘reasonable
expectations’ test sufficiently captures the Legislature’s intended meaning
of ‘oppressive’ actions.” 106 Instead, the court held that “oppressive” under
the relevant statute meant that a majority shareholder engaged in abuse of
authority “with the intent to harm the interests of one or more of the
shareholders.” 107 Acknowledging that “difficulty in—and sometimes even
the impossibility of—selling one’s shares is a characteristic intrinsic to
ownership of a closely held corporation,” the court overruled precedential
Texas cases and took the Delaware approach; the court expected Ann Rupe
to have bargained for “shareholder agreements that contain buy-sell, first
refusal, or redemption provisions that reflect their mutual expectations and
agreements.” 108
Commentators note that “Ritchie will likely result in more abusive
conduct toward minority shareholders . . . . Given this framework, freezeouts and squeeze-outs will become highly attractive to majority
shareholders.” 109 Furthermore, based on the court’s reliance on the ex ante
bargaining expectation, “the real effect of Ritchie is to . . . leave the bulk of
family businesses and small businesses exposed, unless they each had the
foresight, funds, and tactical nous to hire lawyers to re-create the
‘oppression’ wheel for each new business that gets formed.” 110
The outcome of Ritchie underscores that a new group of minority
shareholders (and a large one—those subject to Texas law) now have little
real protection when it comes to shareholder oppression. Ritchie, as one
commentator has also observed, may also have persuasive authority: “As
other states continue to grapple with the contours of their own shareholder
oppression law, they may be tempted to follow Texas and cut back on
shareholder oppression.” 111 The Ritchie ruling may, therefore, cast a long
shadow on shareholder oppression law, leaving minority family

105

Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 865 (quoting Ritchie v. Rupe, 339 S.W.3d 275, 297 (Tex. App. 2011)).
Id. at 870.
107
Id. at 871.
108
Id.
109
James Dawson, Ritchie v. Rupe and the Future of Shareholder Oppression, 124 YALE L.J.F. 89,
92 (2014).
110
Id. at 93 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Erwin Cruz Supporting Respondent at 12, Ritchie v.
Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014) (No. 11-0447), 2014 WL 2788335).
111
Id. at 94.
106
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shareholders faced with an increasing number of blocked exits and narrow
escapes.
B. What Corporate Law Expects from People
The protections that exist for minority shareholders in cases of
oppression are hardly robust, and they may even be on the decline.
However, corporate law does not see this dearth of protection as a problem
because corporate law prioritizes individual bargaining over statutory
buffers. Corporate law treats all corporate actors alike and offers limited
legal protections because of the assumed power of all corporate actors to
bargain. The absence of protections is not a blind spot. Rather, it is a strong
signal of the bargaining expectation placed on all shareholders, including
corporate family members.
These bargaining norms are, in large part, premised on classic
economic principles that drive the expected utility theory and rational actor
model. These principles can be summarized accordingly: “[A]ll human
behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their
utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount
of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.” 112 Corporate
decisionmakers operating in this landscape “conduct an explicit or implicit
cost–benefit analysis of competing options and select the optimal method
of achieving their goals.” 113 These corporate actors are presumed to be
unaffected by competing social norms, idiosyncratic preferences, cultural
formations, and family dynamics.
This expectation of freedom from competing norms and demands
holds true for minority shareholders as well: “According to standard law
and economics, minority shareholders in closely held corporations must
bargain for protection against opportunism by controlling shareholders
before investing.” 114 In fact, some scholars mistakenly believe that
bargaining is even easier and more desirable in closely held corporations.
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel state, for example: “Participants in
closely held corporations are better informed about their legal rights and
obligations than participants in either partnerships or public
corporations.” 115 They mention that these investors often have great
personal wealth at stake and that, in aggregate, there are sufficient
112

GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976).
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1063 (2000).
114
Means, A Contractual Approach supra note 31, at 1162.
115
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 237 (1991).
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inducements for these shareholders to “take care.” 116 Some argue that
because closely held corporations “contain relatively few shareholders,” the
cost of bargaining is lowered to “manageable levels.”117 Ralph Winter goes
further and states that, in closely held corporations, “the participants
kn[ow] each other and ha[ve] ample opportunity to protect themselves by
charter provisions or by side contracts.” 118
Any attempts to override an individual’s contracting autonomy, either
by statute or judicial decree, are perceived, through this particular lens, to
be dangerous: “One ought to tread cautiously in overriding the commercial
arrangements of consenting adults.” 119 In the rational choice model,
therefore, bargaining and the autonomy of the contracting parties are
indisputably paramount. Corporate family members are not, however,
rational actors. Consequently, the rational choice model is misapplied to
minority shareholders in closely held corporations.
C. Family Members’ Bounded Bargaining
Corporate law presumes corporate family members are rational
bargainers who prioritize profit maximization and treat the family business
solely as a source of income and revenue generation, rather than a source of
personal satisfaction and legacy generation. This Section explains why both
of these assumptions are flawed, expanding on the notion that “expected
utility theory is not a good description of actual decisionmaking,” 120
particularly in the context of corporate families.
1. Inheriting, Not Bargaining
Looking at corporate family members from the bargaining
perspective—how much and how well they actually bargain—is revealing.
One phenomenon is immediately striking: observed from up close, it is
evident that corporate family members rarely bargain for their shares. In
any given family business, it is quite likely that the corporate family
members involved did not engage in any bargaining whatsoever for their
shares. In closely held corporations, shares are not generally sold or traded
but often instead passed down through families, from parents to children
and between branches of the family tree. Corporate shares often constitute
much of a family’s wealth and the shares are part of intergenerational
116
Id. The authors continue: “[I]nvestors have the option of bargaining for more protection. They
don’t, which ought to tell us something.” Id. at 241.
117
Means, A Contractual Approach, supra note 31, at 1162.
118
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 283 (1977).
119
Id.
120
Jolls et al., supra note 10, at 1478.
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wealth transfer as opposed to being part of a bargained deal between two
parties. Accordingly, in most family businesses, there is a distinct
possibility that a shareholder inherited her minority shares from someone
else, most likely a parent or spouse.
One of the most common scenarios in corporate families, as we have
seen, is the transferal of corporate shares and ownership from a parent and
founder to her children. 121 This type of intergenerational succession
transfers ownership of shares outside of market-based systems and
precludes any real bargaining. The Ritchie case provides one among many
clear examples of how children inherit shares rather than bargain for them.
Efficient bargaining is, consequently, not always present, and often
individuals in a corporate family come to be stakeholders, both minority
and majority, through means that do not require or even actively disallow
bargaining. 122
2. Bounded Rationality in Family Bargaining
Another fallacy, in addition to the assumption that all corporate family
members bargain to obtain their shares, is that corporate family members
bargain at arm’s length, unencumbered by personal obligations or family
intimacies. Critiquing the rational actor model, one scholar has remarked:
“Both microsocial environments (family, friends, immediate neighbors)
and macrosocial environments (associations, national culture) may affect
an individual’s behavior.” 123 To think that family ties play a part in shaping
an individual’s bargaining ability and position would seem, to most people,
intuitively correct. Behavioral economics, case studies, and case law all
confirm this speculation.
Business partners who are siblings, cousins, or parents and children
are deeply informed and influenced by their affective ties. Corporate family
members have a range of personal histories, longstanding allegiances,
feelings of guilt as well as love, and unaddressed hostilities. As commonly
happens, “sibling [partners] must deal with . . . disagreements about
121

STEPHANIE BRUN DE PONTET ET AL., SIBLINGS AND THE FAMILY BUSINESS: MAKING IT WORK
also Geraldine Fabrikant, Redstone Family
in Dispute over Share Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
10/15/business/15viacom.html [https://perma.cc/2ZRL-7PES]; Matthew Toren, 5 Keys to Successful
Sibling Partnerships, ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/236080
[https://perma.cc/LWT7-VN8J] (suggesting that siblings entering partnerships “[s]et expectations ahead
of time in writing” and “[c]ommunicate frequently and disclose fully” (emphases omitted)).
122
For a different take on the gifting of business shares and minority shareholder oppression, see
Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: Of Change, Gifts, and
Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717 (2002).
123
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 43 (1989).
FOR BUSINESS, THE FAMILY, AND THE FUTURE 6 (2012); see
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ownership or growth and any lingering bitterness over deep-seated
childhood rivalries.” 124 For these reasons, “[s]ibling-partners’ relationships
are among the most challenging in family businesses.” 125 The problems that
occur in all families, including those between siblings, may also be
increased or intensified in blended families.126 Studies have found, in the
blended family, that “disagreements often arise from conflicting loyalties
and feelings of inequality.” 127
Corporate family members must, therefore, constantly navigate the
overlapping of personal and professional identities and roles.128 That is to
say, as a “hybrid identity organization,” 129 a family business requires
corporate family stakeholders to negotiate not only workplace conflict but
also social role confusion. 130 For example:
The CEO of a family enterprise may be the son of its founder, and he may also
be dad to several children and granddad to several grandchildren. He is likely
the husband of a spouse who helped him build the business and raise those
children. He may be a brother to a vice president in the company or even a
124

Jennifer Alsever, How to Run a Successful Sibling Startup, INC. (Nov. 2014),
http://www.inc.com/magazine/201411/jennifer-alsever/he-aint-heavy-hes-my-partner.html
[https://perma.cc/ZFC7-G9SR]; see also Ed Kopf, Am I My Brother’s Keeper?: Brothers in Family
Business, BMC ASSOCS., http://www.bmcassociates.com/resources/blog/brothers-in-family-business/
[https://perma.cc/P77E-R7UQ] (explaining “[siblings] have a lifetime of emotions and experiences to
deal with in their relationship in addition to the demands on all business partners”).
125
Kopf, supra note 124; see also Leslie A. Baxter et al., Turning Points in the Development of
Blended Families, 16 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 291, 292 (1999) (“The blended family, or
stepfamily, is a pervasive social unit in the American social landscape.”).
126
Blended families are those that result from second and third marriages when families from a
first marriage “blend” with the new families. One business commentator has coined the term “blended
family business” to talk about the opportunities and challenges inherent to these companies. See
Michael Finnigan, New Family Business Demographic Coined in New Research, CAMPDEN FB (Sept.
17, 2014, 9:11 A.M.), http://www.campdenfb.com/article/new-family-business-demographic-coinednew-research [https://perma.cc/W546-ASGH]. She has also observed: “[T]he number of requests for
advice from blended family businesses has increased in 2014.” Id.; see also Baxter et al., supra note
125, at 292; Haya El Nasser, With More Blended Families, Estate Planning Gets Ugly, USA TODAY
(Mar. 14, 2012, 3:35 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/parenting-family/story/2012-0313/With-more-blended-families-estate-planning-gets-ugly/53516094/1 [https://perma.cc/4C6H-MHVB]
(discussing family feuds over inheritance and other issues that arise from estate planning with blended
families).
127
Finnigan, supra note 126.
128
Ben Means identifies “Incompatible Values” and “Spillover Oppression” as two of the main
types of conflict in family businesses. See Means, Nonmarket Values, supra note 12, at 1212−16.
Incompatible values are “[t]ensions between business goals and family values,” whereas spillover
oppression occurs when “[b]reakdowns in family relationships . . . cause havoc in the workplace.” Id. at
1212, 1214.
129
Whetten et al., supra note 2, at 481.
130
Id. (“Conflict can be particularly taxing as family entanglements worsen stressful situations . . . .
Overlapping family and business relationships may complicate how firms are managed and potentially
increase the intensity and frequency of conflicts.”).
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copresident with a sibling. In addition to being uncle to his siblings’ children,
he may also be their boss if they work in the family enterprise. 131

Without an ability to compartmentalize, corporate family members may
allow personal differences and conflicts to spill over into the workplace.
From a slightly different perspective, corporate family members may
not bargain in the way they are assumed to because of their trust and faith
in their corporate family colleagues. The court in Brenner v. Berkowitz
remarked: “Shareholders of close corporations are often family or close
friends. Those persons often fail to provide for involuntary dissolution
because they do not expect irreconcilable differences to arise.” 132 Family
members, like those entering marriage, enter into joint and collaborative
enterprises with other family members in the spirit of optimism and
endurance. 133 Preexisting trust between the parties often means that
corporate family members are less likely to bargain or bargain strenuously
for their stake in the family business.
These corporate family members are, therefore, most emphatically not
classic rational actors. In fact, as Benjamin Means remarks: “The rational
actor model of human behavior bears at most an approximate relation to
reality [in the closely held corporation].” 134 Contracting between these
parties is a complicated matter, inextricably linked with the family
framework and its characteristic qualities. The result, as Means has also
observed: “It is no secret that minority shareholders in close corporations
tend not to bargain for adequate protection, a problem that has been evident
for decades.” 135
3. Bounded Self-Interest and Socioemotional Wealth
In addition to operating from a position of bounded rationality when it
comes to bargaining with one another, corporate family members often
operate from a position of bounded self-interest. Law and economics
scholars have suggested: “Self-interest is bounded in a much broader range
of settings than conventional economics assumes, and the bound operates

131

KENT RHODES & DAVID LANSKY, MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE FAMILY BUSINESS:
UNDERSTANDING CHALLENGES AT THE INTERSECTION OF FAMILY AND BUSINESS 13 (2013).
132
634 A.2d 1019, 1026 (N.J. 1993) (citation omitted).
133
Means, Nonmarket Values, supra note 12, at 1240 (observing that higher levels of trust and
loyalty benefit family businesses).
134
Means, A Contractual Approach, supra note 31, at 1163. Moreover, that corporate law makes
no accommodation for these relationships is problematic because “[m]any of these [corporate family]
minority shareholders are not sophisticated actors or repeat players, and therefore they will not know
that they need to negotiate for additional protections.” Dawson, supra note 109, at 93.
135
Means, A Contractual Approach, supra note 31, at 1172.
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in ways different from what the conventional understanding suggests.” 136 In
the corporate family context, family members limit their self-interest in a
number of ways. For example, in family businesses, feelings of love,
loyalty, or spite may overcome the individual’s self-interest in any number
of situations. 137 More broadly, however, corporate family members bind
their own self-interest by intentionally putting other values ahead of profit
maximization. Corporate family members are, in this way, idiosyncratic
bargainers.
Family members are idiosyncratic corporate actors because they start
family businesses for a range of reasons, some deeply personal, such as to
create a specialized workplace, to make real a shared entrepreneurial
vision, or to pursue certain ideals through corporate activity. The corporate
family may privilege certain competencies, cultural values, religious
beliefs, or political philosophies in the way that they run and manage the
corporation. Family firms and the closely held corporate form, therefore,
allow family members to bring shared values into a workplace environment
and shape the corporate environment through value-driven leadership. 138
Family businesses may “speak to people’s hearts in a way that other
businesses do not.” 139
Accordingly, business scholars have recognized “that family firms are
motivated by non-financial aspects and family owners are committed to the
preservation of their socioemotional wealth.” 140 Other types of “wealth”
that families may consider and value include “close identification of family
members with the firm, preservation of a positive family image, concerns
about the company’s perpetuation, desires of family members to influence
decisions, and care for acquaintances and community relations.”141 The
drive to create and preserve socioemotional wealth may, then, “explain the
family firm’s substantial responsiveness to stakeholder needs as driven by
non-economic utilities derived by dominant family owners.” 142
One example of how family businesses pursue values outside of and
in addition to profit maximization arose in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,

136

Jolls et al., supra note 10, at 1479.
Id. Striking a chord with family dynamics, these scholars note that “the agents in a behavioral
economic model are both nicer and (when they are not treated fairly) more spiteful than the agents
postulated by neoclassical theory.” Id.
138
Sorenson, supra note 12, at 464.
139
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140
Pascual Berrone et al., Family-Controlled Firms and Stakeholder Management: A
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Inc. 143 In that case, the Court observed how the closely held corporate
structure allowed the Green family to run its business according to specific
principles: “Each family member has signed a pledge to run the businesses
in accordance with the family’s religious beliefs and to use the family
assets to support Christian ministries.” 144 Moreover, the Greens’ business
practices demonstrated a clear pursuit of noneconomic goals: “In
accordance with those commitments, Hobby Lobby and Mardel stores
close on Sundays, even though the Greens calculate that they lose millions
in sales annually by doing so.” 145 The Court observed that the Greens also
refused to facilitate or promote alcohol use, thereby declining to participate
in a number of profitable transactions. 146 In addition, the corporation
contributed to Christian ministries and bought “hundreds of full-page
newspaper ads inviting people to ‘know Jesus as Lord and Savior.’” 147
Other companies, like Blue State Coffee, announce: “[W]e were founded
on ideals, not just for profit,” 148 and support fair trade, fair wages, and
sustainable practices regardless of whether these practices decrease the
company’s profit margin.
Family businesses enable families to give corporate form to their
personal values and permit them to express those values through workplace
culture, management practices, and organizational strategy. In addition,
family businesses and closely held corporations allow families to pursue a
particular entrepreneurial vision without regard to profitability. As some
scholars argue, the closely held corporation might be an attractive and
successful organizational form because:
[An entrepreneur] can pursue her idea for as long as she wants and in
whatever manner she prefers, even if the business is losing money and every
expert in the field believes that she is pursuing a surefire failure of an idea. No
matter how much money she loses, no one can force her to sell the business,
hire a professional manager, or close the business down. 149

Consequently, the way in which family businesses allow corporate families
to pursue socioemotional wealth as well as entrepreneurial vision undercuts
the dominant stereotype of the rational bargainer that corporate law
143

134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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assumes. Corporate family members may bargain, but they are bargaining
for any number of benefits and types of return on their investments.
Corporate family members are not only attenuated but also idiosyncratic
bargainers. Consequently, the current bargaining model for these corporate
actors requires a new theoretical basis.
II. DISPATCHES FROM FAMILY LAW
Minority shareholders who are corporate partners may not have a
guaranteed form of financial protection at the termination of the corporate
relationship, but corporate spouses do. Divorce and death trigger a range of
rights for spouses and corporate spouses at these junctures, giving them
automatic rights to corporate property that no other corporate partners have.
If the corporate spouse is divorcing, she has a high likelihood of obtaining
a fair share of corporate assets through equitable distribution. Furthermore,
if the conflict carries through past the death of one spouse and into
inheritance claims, the surviving corporate spouse has robust rights to
corporate property in the form of intestate and elective share rights. This
Part analyzes the myriad protections that are in place for corporate spouses
and the property guarantees available to them at divorce and death,
highlighting the ways in which family law understands bounded bargaining
and, based on this understanding, offers protections to economically
vulnerable parties.
A. Divorcing the Firm, Protecting the Spouse
As a result of the “divorce revolution” 150 and the elimination of fault
divorce in most states, divorce is an always-available option for couples in
conflict. Moreover, many divorcing couples are also business partners.
Married couples start businesses together or work together in family
businesses started by one spouse’s parents. In addition, many spouses
contribute indirectly to family businesses by playing a supporting role,
managing the household and being a traditional corporate spouse151 who
entertains, networks, and advises. At the time of divorce, ownership of
corporate assets will be in question for these corporate spouses. During the
150
LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
151
See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, The Significant Other, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/fashion/28wives.html
[https://perma.cc/AY4Y-V6FV];
Hal
Lancaster, A Corporate Wife’s Job: From Those Who Know, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 1997, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB870125393714956500 [https://perma.cc/R5LD-8SJQ]; James B.
Stewart, A C.E.O.’s Support System, a k a Husband, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/business/a-ceos-support-system-a-k-a-husband.html
[https://perma.cc/H7CH-XTM9].
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divorce, the court must characterize all the couple’s property, decide
whether it is separate or marital, value that property, and then distribute it
between the spouses. This Section explains how this process works with
respect to corporate assets and explores the protections that are in place for
spouses at every step of the process.
1. Characterizing Corporate Property
When spouses are equal business partners—sharing in corporate
stock, management authority, and operational decisionmaking—the court’s
job of dividing corporate assets is relatively easy. In these cases, the
corporate assets are generally all marital property and will be divided
equally. Ownership of shares alone, however, is not dispositive. As the
South Carolina Supreme Court stated in a 2015 equitable-distribution case:
“Upon dissolution of the marriage, marital property should be divided and
distributed in a manner which fairly reflects each spouse’s contribution to
its acquisition, regardless of who holds legal title.” 152
Consequently, even if one spouse owns all of the corporate shares,
active partnering in the business will render the shares joint property. In
Floyd v. Floyd, a Florida case in which the wife was “a housewife, mother,
and business partner in the parties’ family enterprise of acquiring rental and
commercial properties,” 153 the husband held title to three of the couple’s
rental properties despite the fact that “[j]oint bank account funds were used
to acquire them, and meet the mortgage and tax payments on them” 154 and
the wife managed the properties. At trial, the wife testified that “she
considered she had a 50% interest in these three properties; and the
husband himself admitted she was entitled to some interest in the
properties, although he denied her right to as much as a half-interest.” 155
The trial court disagreed, but on appeal the court concluded that “the wife
established a special equity in these properties,” 156 and awarded her 50% in
the properties in recognition of her sizable contribution to the success of
the business. 157
Similarly, in a Tennessee case, a husband a wife worked together
running a computer repair and refurbishment company, A & F, which they
had started together. 158 The business was registered in the wife’s name
152
Moore v. Moore, 779 S.E.2d 533, 552 (S.C. 2015) (quoting Morris v. Morris, 517 S.E.2d 720,
723 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999)).
153
383 So. 2d 773, 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
154
Id. at 774.
155
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156
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157
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158
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because the husband “did not want the new company to be involved in his
divorce case. Also, he did not want to report any income on his federal
income tax return which might result in income tax consequences as a
result of his receipt of Social Security old age benefits.” 159 At the time of
divorce, the wife therefore argued that the business was a sole
proprietorship instead of a partnership. 160
The trial court held in the wife’s favor that the business was a sole
proprietorship. 161 On appeal, however, the court reviewed evidence
presented at trial that “both [spouses] did ‘everything’ at A & F.” 162 The
court continued: “Although the business was listed in Wife’s name on its
license and other documents, such as a car loan application and tax returns,
it is undisputed that both parties devoted their time, experience, and effort
into its operation and shared in the profits.” 163 This evidence led the
appellate court to conclude that the parties had a partnership and,
furthermore, that “domestic relations law, and not partnership law, is
controlling in the context of the parties’ divorce.” 164 The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act had “no application to the case at bar.”165
Finally, some courts are even willing to go outside of equitabledistribution rules and use equitable solutions to take into consideration time
spent by spouses working together in a family business before marriage. In
a Massachusetts case, Moriarty v. Stone, the woman started working for her
future husband in 1975 at his family jewelry store, the Family Jewels. She
began working as a clerk and “[w]ithin approximately one year, the wife
was involved in virtually all aspects of the business.” 166 For almost ten
years, the two put in “tireless effort” 167 and the “business prospered.” 168 In
1986, the two married, having accumulated “considerable savings and
retirement benefits prior to their marriage.” 169
At the time of divorce, the trial court included “retirement-related
benefits that were accrued prior to the marriage” 170 in the marital estate. On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed this ruling, stating: “[I]t would not only
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
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167
168
169
170

Id. at 543.
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Id. at 539.
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Moriarty v. Stone, 668 N.E.2d 1338, 1341 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
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Id.
Id. at 1343.

31

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

be unfair and inequitable to disregard the parties’ respective contributions
during their ten-year period of cohabitation but also inconsistent with the
concept of ‘contribution.’” 171
Thus, family law, unlike corporate law, looks outside of ownership to
contribution as a guiding principle at the termination of a partnership.
2. Considering Individual Contributions
Spousal contribution, then, is the dispositive factor in determining
what percentage each spouse receives of the corporate assets subject to
equitable distribution. 172 An important protection for corporate spouses is
that they have a claim to corporate assets not only for direct but also
indirect contributions to the success of a business venture. If both spouses
made direct contributions to the family business, they will likely be entitled
to equal shares in the corporate enterprise. If only one spouse worked
directly in the business, however, the other spouse is still entitled to
compensation if that spouse provided support and caretaking services
within the home—indirect contributions that allowed the working spouse to
succeed with the business. Here, I explain how courts approach the
question of both direct and indirect contributions to a family business and
model ways to award shareholder rights outside of the narrow rational actor
bargaining model.
a. Direct Contributions: Equal Work, Equal Shares?
Because marital property division, including the division of corporate
assets, turns on spousal contributions, couples fight bitterly over what
contributions each has made to their joint enterprises. Not all contributions
are easily identified and valued, and as a result, courts must engage in factintensive inquiries in order to determine what contributions each party
made and what percentage of the marital assets each spouse should receive.
The dispute over individual contributions was, for example, central to
the proceedings in Moore v. Moore, a 2015 divorce case from South
171

Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1343 (“The parties’ respective contributions to the marital partnership remain the
touchstone of an equitable division of the marital estate.”). For some representative cases, see, for
example, Cassiday v. Cassiday, 716 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Haw. 1986) (“These decisions are consistent with
the time honored proposition that marriage is a partnership to which both partners bring their financial
resources as well as their individual energies and efforts.”), Williams v. Williams, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66
(Va. Ct. App. 1987) (“The ‘equitable distribution’ statute, however, is intended to recognize a marriage
as a partnership and to provide a means to divide equitably the wealth accumulated during and by that
partnership based on the monetary and non-monetary contributions of each spouse.”), and Lacey v.
Lacey, 173 N.W.2d 142, 144–45 (Wis. 1970) (“The division of the property of the divorced parties rests
upon the concept of marriage as a shared enterprise or joint undertaking. It is literally a partnership,
although a partnership in which contributions and equities of the partners may and do differ from
individual case to individual case.”).
172
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Carolina that went all the way to the state supreme court.173 The wife had
opened a lighting and design business, Candelabra, just before she married
her husband. 174 The wife registered Candelabra as an S Corporation, with
51% of the stock in her name and 49% in her husband’s name. 175 The wife
served as the company’s president and was “responsible for overseeing all
business operations: financial forecasting and management, budgeting,
hiring, scheduling, training, merchandising, and most importantly, selecting
and displaying all of the products.” 176 The husband held the title of vice
president, however the trial court determined that, prior to 2005, he “was
not actively involved in the business.” 177
In 2005, roles changed when the wife had complications with a
pregnancy and was ordered on bed rest.178 The husband took on a greater
role in the company, although he and his wife fought over some of his
sales-generation strategies. 179 In addition, as the business landscape
changed and the company needed a web presence, the husband helped with
the project, reading books on website design and branding. 180 The spouses
had differing views, however, concerning the amount of work the husband
put into the development of the website, a project that ultimately increased
revenue significantly and moved 80% of the company’s sales online. 181
Speaking about the husband’s participation, the wife testified at trial: “If
Sam Moore had not been my husband . . . he would have been out [of
Candelabra] a long time ago because he didn’t do enough to acquire even
what a part-time position would do.” 182 The husband, alternately, testified
that he had been an integral part of the website-development team and a
“purveyor of ideas.” 183
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779 S.E.2d 533, 537 (S.C. 2015).
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that sells trendy, high-end boutique lighting, home furnishings, and home accessories in a retail
showroom.” Id. at 537.
175
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Id. at 541.
183
Id.
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The trial court was sufficiently convinced of the husband’s business
contributions to award him half the value of the company. On appeal, the
court remarked:
In light of our review of the record, we find Husband vastly overstates his
contributions . . . . [T]he record convinces us that Husband was a purveyor of
ideas, but he left the details of putting his ideas into action to others with a
solid work ethic, such as Wife. 184

Nonetheless, the appellate court concluded that there had been no abuse of
discretion and affirmed the award of half the company to the husband,
observing that, “while awarding a greater share of the marital estate to Wife
could be justified, we see no reason to set aside the family court’s equal
division of the marital estate.” 185 The husband, then, received half of the
corporate assets for his direct contributions, questionable as they were.
b. Indirect Contributions: Valuing Wives 186
Even if a spouse does not contribute directly to the family business but
instead provides indirect contributions by taking responsibility for childrearing and housework, the court will award a percentage of the business
assets to that spouse. The percentage of corporate assets that the spouse
making the indirect contributions receives varies depending on the length
of the marriage and the extent of the indirect contributions. Unlike most
assets, family businesses are not generally subject to the presumption of
equal division and are counted as “special” assets. 187 This special treatment
is particularly evident if one spouse has put intensive work into building
the business or if one spouse’s family has strong historical associations
with the business. In these cases, distribution of these assets therefore often
diverges significantly from the equal division standard and ranges from
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Id.
Id. at 552.
186
I use the term wife to denote someone who, in the traditional usage of the word, is a caretaker
and support system for her spouse, “someone in her (or his) life who will pick up the dry cleaning, keep
track of appointments, do the laundry, take the kids to soccer practice, get dinner on the table, manage
the social calendar, and vacuum, dust, and scour the tub.” See Laura A. Rosenbury, Work Wives,
36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 345, 381 (2013). This role has traditionally been fulfilled by women, but a
person of any gender could be in the role.
187
In some states, there is not only a presumption but also a rule that equitable distribution means
equal, thereby requiring courts that do not divide assets equally to provide written explanations for the
divergence from the standard. See 2 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 8:2
(3d ed. 2015) (observing that while, “[a] majority of states hold that the division of property between
the parties should depend only upon the trial court’s balancing of the equitable distribution factors . . . .
[a] respectable minority of state statutes presume that an equal division is equitable”).
185
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30% to as low as 10%. 188 It is particularly important for the spouse making
indirect contributions to make the case for her role in the other spouse’s
corporate success.
Another divorce case that went to the state supreme court, McCulloch
v. McCulloch turned on the question of a wife’s indirect contributions to
her husband’s business. 189 When deciding what share of the family business
to award to the wife, the trial court concluded that Hope “made little or no
contribution” to the family business, which had been in the husband’s
family for multiple generations. 190 Nonetheless, the trial judge stated that
“[Hope] served as a homemaker and as such [wa]s entitled to a share of the
marital assets.” 191 The judge consequently awarded the wife 25% of the two
family companies, leaving the rest to the husband. In justifying this award,
the judge remarked that
[I]t would be completely inequitable for [Hope] to receive a portion of the
share in Microfibres, Inc. equal to [James] whose blood, sweat and tears and
contributions by his family ha[d] been the reason for both the past success and
what hopefully w[ould] be the future success of th[e] corporation. 192

Despite the court’s clear sense, then, that the corporate assets were a
special asset for the husband, whose heritage and hard work had built the
companies, the wife received a quarter of the value of the companies for
the support that she provided to her husband.
Recognizing this support role very explicitly, the trial judge in Sykes
v. Sykes, a 2014 case from New York, awarded the wife 30% of the value
188
Family businesses are generally considered “special assets” and exempt from the presumption
of equal division.
Although the law often favors a distribution of marital assets that is as equal as possible,
especially in a marriage of a fairly long duration such as this, it cannot be said that a fifty-fifty
division of a titled spouse’s business is the standard irrespective of the contribution by the nontitled spouse.
Contrary to what defendant argues, case law has long confirmed that business assets are
to be treated differently from other assets for purposes of equitable distribution.
Sykes v. Sykes, 313085/2010, 2014 WL 1797010, at *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 2, 2014); see also Ron
Tweel & Elizabeth Coughter, Deviations from a 50/50 Split of Marital Assets in Equitable Distribution,
http://www.michiehamlett.com/tweel-coughter-deviations-equitable-distribution/
MICHIEHAMLETT,
[https://perma.cc/5PLX-X5WB] (“Therefore, the proponent for an unequal and greater award of a
family business will succeed if there is proof of greater efforts made by the proponent in actually
creating and pursuing the business enterprise. This unequal award is particularly true when the other
non-employee spouse is active at home or in other efforts and has little to do with the business
enterprise.”).
189
69 A.3d 810, 818 (R.I. 2013).
190
Id. (concluding “[Hope] ha[d] in no significant way done anything to contribute towards the
acquisition, preservation or appreciation of the corporate assets”).
191
Id.
192
Id.
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of her husband’s hedge fund. 193 Substantial trial time went toward
establishing the extent of the wife’s contributions, and the husband “took
the position that even though defendant did not work outside the home and
was very much a ‘stay-at-home mom,’ her contributions on the domestic
front were ultimately quite limited.” 194 He argued that his wife did not
perform housework, did not cook or clean, and did not even perform the
task of “removing the plastic from the dry cleaning.” 195 The wife, he
argued, “outsourced most domestic chores” 196 and was reliant on staff to
perform most household chores as well as childcare. 197 The husband also
presented evidence that the wife entertained infrequently and failed,
therefore, to take on the role of “corporate spouse.” 198
The court nevertheless concluded that she had contributed to her
husband’s success in context-appropriate ways. The court observed that
social norms prescribed that the wife employ a full staff, delegate a range
of menial chores, and hire full-time help for childcare purposes.199
Referencing household-management responsibilities taken on by women
running great estates, the court remarked:
Like a latter-day Cora Crawley, Countess of Grantham, who unquestionably
runs the household at Downton Abbey despite the presence of Mr. Carson,
Mrs. Hughes, Mrs. Patmore and Daisy, defendant unquestionably ran the
Sykes household in New York, East Hampton and Paris despite the presence
of cooks, personal assistants and the person who unsheathed the dry
cleaning. 200

The important thing, the court observed, was that she had been
available to her husband, had provided him with the home he desired and
the support he needed to be successful in his work life. 201 As the wife
testified, their agreement was that it was her job “to make sure when he
came home he could be rejuvenated and go back out and slay the dragons
on Wall Street.” 202 These were, then, the indirect contributions that the
court recognized and rewarded.
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Consequently, unlike a minority shareholder who can be completely
barred from any relief, spouses generally have a guaranteed right to a
certain percentage of corporate assets. The exact percentage varies
according to contribution; however, even with no direct contribution and no
title ownership, family law offers certain protections and a spouse is
generally entitled to a share of the assets.
B. Surviving Spouses Inherit the Firm
Inheritance law, like equitable-distribution rules, protects spouses
from financial distress when one spouse dies by giving the other spouse a
claim to jointly acquired and maintained property. Surviving spouses have
strong property rights through intestacy law should the spouse die without a
valid will or should a court determine that a will is invalid. 203 Moreover, if
one spouse tries to disinherit the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse
may elect to take the forced spousal share and automatically receive a
portion of the decedent’s estate. 204 Intestacy and forced share rights
underscore that, unlike a minority corporate shareholder, a surviving
corporate spouse has a strong set of rights at the end of the corporate
relationship, even if the relationship was fraught with conflict. This Section
discusses how rights accorded to surviving spouses work to protect them in
the face of financial insecurity, personal conflict, and adverse actions taken
by the other spousein other words, in the face of oppressive behavior.
1. Surviving Spouses Win by Default
Intestacy rules are default rules meant to approximate the estate plan
that most decedents would have chosen if they had been testate. The
assumption is overwhelmingly that deceased spouses would want to
provide for their surviving spouses (regardless of the truth of that
assumption in specific cases). Accordingly, in all states, intestacy rules
provide that a surviving spouse is entitled to a share of a decedent’s estate
if he dies without a will or if a will is ruled invalid. The percentage of the
estate going to the surviving spouse depends on the jurisdiction. 205 In New
York, for example, a surviving spouse would receive everything if there

203

JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 70–71 (9th ed. 2013).
Id. at 512–20.
205
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 75 (1991). A revised version of
Article II of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) was passed in 1990, and it adjusts the percentage of a
surviving spouse’s benefits according to the length of the couple’s marriage, reaching a maximum of
50% after fifteen years. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2 cmt. at 61 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1990). Nine states
have adopted the 1990 Revision of Article II in its entirety, and numerous other states have adopted the
UPC in an incomplete form. LEGAL INFO. INST., Uniform Probate Code, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/probate [https://perma.cc/63AP-F4ZY].
204
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were no children but only $50,000 of intestate property if there were
descendants of any kind. 206 In Virginia, the spouse would inherit everything
in the absence of children as well but also everything if the couple had
children. 207 The surviving spouse’s share would only be diminished if the
decedent had children from a previous relationship, and then the surviving
spouse’s share would decrease to one-third of the estate. 208
If, for example, one spouse died without leaving a will, the surviving
spouse would receive all the deceased spouse’s shares of the business if the
couple had no children. Even if they had children, or the deceased spouse
had children from a previous marriage, the surviving spouse would receive
a certain number of shares. Consequently, the surviving spouse could
quickly go from being minority shareholder to majority shareholder in a
family business, able to assert voice and leadership, potentially reshaping
the company through her new majority ownership. A surviving corporate
spouse might, therefore, find herself in an improved business position after
inheriting additional shares through intestacy. The same would be true even
if the decedent spouse had a will but a court determined that it was invalid
due, for example, to a problem with the will formalities or a successful
claim of undue influence.
Furthermore, a surviving spouse has a claim to her intestate share of
the estate even if the spouses had been experiencing marital discord or
were not living together at the time of spouse’s death. Marital conflict,
even after having filed for divorce, does not change a surviving spouse’s
intestate rights at all. The only claim that an estate can bring to bar a
surviving spouse from receiving her intestacy share is abandonment. 209
Subsequently, what constitutes abandonment is a question that courts
address with some frequency and have, generally, answered by setting a
high threshold. For example, a New York appellate court upheld a wife’s
right to her elective share even though the wife had lived apart from her
husband for twenty-three years. 210 Affirming this right, the court wrote:
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N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A (McKinney 2011).
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-200 (2012).
208
Id.
209
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 203, at 519; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64. 2-308
(2016). Other states have similar statutory provisions. For some representative cases, see Boudreau v.
Slaton, 9 So. 3d 495, 499–500 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (where a spouse dies before a final entry of
divorce, the divorce action abates and the surviving spouse can still take his or her elective share), and
Purce v. Patterson, 654 S.E.2d 885, 886 (Va. 2008) (abandonment must continue until death of the
spouse).
210
In re Duplessis, 123 A.D.3d 927, 927 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (“In 1987, Jennie left the marital
home, and she lived separately from the decedent until the decedent’s death in 2010.”).
207
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[M]ore must be shown than a mere departure from the marital abode and a
consequent living separate and apart . . . . [O]ne who seeks to impose such a
forfeiture must, in addition, establish . . . that the abandonment was unjustified
and without the consent of the other spouse. 211

One New York court even lamented the frequency with which a surviving
spouse who had been separated from the deceased spouse received an
intestate distribution, stating: “Such obviously unjust results are frequent
and commonplace in these posthumous matrimonial trials in this Court.” 212
The majority of state courts have, however, reaffirmed the traditional
standard thereby enabling the surviving spouse to take her share of the
estate even in the midst of marital conflict. 213
In fact, only in the rarest of circumstances does a court bar the spouse
from intestate rights. In a 2012 case from the Surrogate’s Court in New
York, In re Estate of Hama, the question of abandonment arose in the
context of a wife’s right to her intestate share of the husband’s estate,
which was worth approximately $1.5 million at the time of his death and
included the value of his privately owned design business.214 The husband
and wife had worked together at the husband’s business before getting
married in 2006. 215 However, based on testimony from the husband’s
accountant, the court remarked that “[t]he reason for the marriage may or
may not have been romantic” and may have been instead a way to avoid a
tax burden for the decedent. 216 Adding weight to the speculation, the
husband and his spouse had an open relationship, and she registered in
marriage in Japan with another man. 217 Because of the instrumental nature
of the marriage, and what looked like a form of benefits fraud, the court
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Id. at 928.
In re Lamos’ Estate, 313 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782–83 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1970) (“[T]he parties had
probably separated by mutual consent and [the wife] seemed neither to have desired or looked to her
husband for support.”).
213
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 203, at 519 (“In a minority of states, the elective share
is denied to a surviving spouse who abandoned or refused to support the deceased spouse.” (emphasis
added)); see also Naim D. Bulbulia & Jonathan W. Wolfe, Dying to Get a Divorce?: Why Interim Wills
BAR
ASS’N
(Sept.
2005),
Are
Essential
for
Divorcing
Clients,
AM.
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newslet
ter_home/dyingtodivorce.html [https://perma.cc/HXG3-W5VR] (“[M]ost states’ Intestacy Statutes do
not explicitly exclude spouses who have separated or are in the process of divorcing, and there is little
precedent elucidating how such a situation would be resolved.”).
214
957 N.Y.S.2d 583, 584–86 (N.Y. Sur. Court 2012).
215
Id. at 585.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 586.
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concluded that the wife had “forfeited the rights with respect to his estate
that would otherwise accrue to her as his surviving spouse.” 218
Absent circumstances that call into question the validity of the entire
marriage, all other conflicts are generally seen as ordinary and spousal
rights to intestate property, including corporate assets, are relatively
inviolable. Based on status granted by relationship rather than power
accorded through bargaining, surviving spouses are entitled to property
rights even when the decedent spouse failed to make any such property
provisions.
2. Elective Rights and Forced Sharing
If the decedent spouse does have a will but either leaves the surviving
spouse out of it entirely or leaves her with minimal assets, the surviving
spouse still has rights to the decedent’s estate, including corporate assets,
through what is called either the elective or forced spousal share. 219 The
share is generally equal to one-third of the estate but, as with intestacy
rights, the rules vary by state. 220 In New York, if a surviving spouse takes
her elective share, she will receive all of the estate assets if the decedent’s
assets consisted of $50,000 or less. 221 If the decedent’s assets were more
than $50,000, then the surviving spouse is entitled to the greater of $50,000
or one-third of the estate assets. 222 In Virginia, the surviving spouse
receives one-half of the decedent’s estate as her elective share if the
decedent left no surviving descendants and one-third if the decedent left
surviving children or their descendants.223 The Uniform Probate Code,
basing its rule explicitly on the economic partnership theory of marriage,
provides that the surviving spouse receive up to half of the estate but also
suggests conditioning the amount on the length of marriage.224

218

Id. at 591.
Both terms are used to describe this share: it is elective from the spouse’s perspective and
forced from the estate’s.
220
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 203, at 513.
221
N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A (McKinney 2011).
222
Id.
223
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-304 (2016).
224
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 to -203 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). When the drafters of the
UPC changed the elective share from one-third of a decedent’s estate to one-half for marriages of a
requisite length, they explained changes thusly: “The elective share of the surviving spouse was
fundamentally revised . . . . to bring elective-share law into line with the contemporary view of marriage
as an economic partnership. The economic partnership theory of marriage is already implemented under
the equitable distribution system.” UNIFORM L. COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
pt. 2, at 1 (Jan. 12, 2008), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/probate%20code/
electiveshare_technicalamend_jan08.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G9G-S4PB].
219

40

112:1 (2017)

Corporate Family Law

Similar to intestacy disputes, relatives or the decedent’s estate will
sometimes try to bar the surviving spouse from receiving the elective share
through claims of disqualification and abandonment. In In re Estate of
Post, the estate tried to bar a surviving spouse from her elective share on
the grounds that “prior to decedent’s death, he and plaintiff had lived apart
‘under circumstances which would have given rise to a cause of action for
divorce or nullity of marriage.’” 225 The estate claimed that the wife “had
been a habitual alcoholic,” that the “decedent had become frustrated by
plaintiff’s demands for more money,” that the spouses “had ceased having
marital relations” almost ten years prior to the husband’s death, and that the
wife “had refused to take decedent to a hospital while he was allegedly
demonstrating symptoms of a heart attack.” 226 The court, however, found
that there was insufficient credible evidence to support the estate’s claims
of abandonment and concluded that these claims did not preclude the wife
from receiving her elective share.227 Many abandonment claims, especially
constructive abandonment claims, fail and the surviving spouse’s rights
prevail.
More often, conflicts over the elective share turn on what assets are
included in the estate. Some states statutorily define what assets go into the
estate for purposes of calculating the elective share, including nonprobate
as well as probate assets. 228 Classic cases have addressed the question of
whether life insurance proceeds, funds in pay-on-death accounts, and trust
assets are includable in the estate. The composite of all the includable
assets is called the augmented estate. With respect to corporate family
shares, the augmented-estate question is acutely relevant because corporate
shares are often held in trust, and questions arise about whether these assets
count for the purposes of the elective share.
In Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, for example, the husband’s
wealth consisted of shares in three separate closely held family
businesses. 229 His assets included a large working farm (which he owned
completely), a coal company (in which he had a minority interest), and a
steel supply company (in which he was the majority owner and his wife
and son had small minority interests). 230 In addition to his ownership

225

659 A.2d 500, 502 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (footnote omitted) (quoting N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:8-1 (1982)).
226
Id.
227
Id. The wife did not, however, receive her elective share for other reasons concerning the
valuation and inclusion of various trust interests.
228
See, for example, Iowa’s statute, IOWA CODE § 633.238 (2017).
229
379 S.E.2d 752, 754 (W. Va. 1989).
230
Id.
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interests, the husband also “worked primarily in a management capacity,
overseeing the day-to-day operation of these three businesses.” 231
Six years before his death, the husband transferred his shares in these
companies into a trust, with a bank as trustee.232 When the husband
subsequently died, the will entitled the wife “to receive tangible personal
property valued at $12,750 and jointly owned assets valued at $7,250.”233
The probate estate was valued at approximately $158,000 while the trust
assets had a purported value of nearly $1.4 million. The wife, not
surprisingly, renounced her rights to take from the will and elected instead
to take her statutory elective share.234
The question then arose as to whether or not the corporate shares in
trust constituted part of the augmented estate. The court, restating the
policy objectives of the legislature, wrote: “[Election] attempts to protect a
surviving spouse against the possibility of disinheritance”; the court also
recognized, however, that “numerous” forms of nonprobate transfer could
easily be used to “diminish a surviving spouse’s elective share.” 235 The
court concluded that, although the husband had transferred his shares into
the trust, “he did not part with the incidents of ownership. Instead, Mr.
Johnson was free to manage his business interests just as he had always
done.” 236 The transfer was “illusory” in the sense that he retained
substantial if not entire dominion and control over the assets.
Consequently, the assets in trust were part of the decedent’s augmented
probate estate and subject to the elective share and the surviving spouse
received her portion of the shares in trust.237
Ultimately, there is only one secure way to safeguard corporate shares
from a spouse: prenuptial agreement. In In re Estate of Sorenson-Peters,
the wife was the owner of a family business and married to her third
husband. 238 When the wife died three years into this marriage in a plane
crash, her estate tried to disqualify the husband from asserting his right to
the spousal share on the grounds that the marriage was failing. The estate
brought forth witnesses who “testified the decedent described [her
231

Id.
Id. at 755.
233
Id. at 756.
234
Id. at 755–56.
235
Id. at 756.
236
Id. at 761. The court analyzed the question using the traditional “illusory transfer” test as well as
the intent to defraud and the present donative intent tests. Id. at 757–59. Ultimately, the court adopted a
“flexible standard” that allowed the taking “into account all of the circumstances and . . . equities on
each side.” Id. at 759 (quoting Davis v. KB & T Co., 309 S.E.2d 45, 50 (W. Va. 1983)).
237
Id. at 762.
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No. 11-1547, 2012 WL 5355712, at *2−3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2012).
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husband] as lazy, with no work ethic . . . using her for her income.” 239 The
court found the testimony unconvincing240 and, accordingly, the husband
received his elective portion of the estate.
Not subject to the husband’s elective share, however, were the
corporate assets because of a prenuptial agreement: “This was the third
marriage for both parties, and prior to the marriage, [the husband] signed a
prenuptial agreement, disclaiming any interest or right in the decedent’s
family’s business.” 241 Without any further intervention from the court or the
parties, the corporate assets, worth approximately $1 million, went as
directed by the prenuptial agreement to the decedent’s children from
previous marriages. 242 Contracting out of the rules governing the elective
share is, therefore, not only possible but also the best way to ensure that a
surviving spouse (or ex-spouse) will not have access to shares in a family
business. 243
Absent a prenuptial agreementa limited bargaining opportunity for
soon-to-be spousesthe rights of the surviving spouse are paramount,
making disinheritance impossible and asset sheltering extremely difficult.
These default, status-based property rights that spouses have at death, like
at divorce, underscore that there are alternate theories and methods for
allocating rights to family business stakeholders.
C. Bargaining in the Shadow of Marriage
The obvious question, then, iswhy marriage is different? Why do
corporate spouses receive greater protections than any other corporate
partners? That marriage and marriage partners are treated differently may
not surprise anyone; moreover, this privileged treatment may seem
intuitively correct to some. After all, spouses share a certain type of
intimacy, they endure more and different things than other partners, and
they are expected to share in ways that business partners do not necessarily
share. The reason that spouses receive greater protections than any other
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Id. at *3.
The estate also tried to bar the husband from his share in the damages recovered from the
wrongful death suit, while also barring the estate’s portion of the same damages from being subject to
the husband’s elective share. Id. at *5. The court concluded, however, that wrongful death proceeds
were counted as personal property under intestacy statutes in the Iowa Code and were, therefore, subject
to the intestate share. Id. at *7. The damages were divided between the children, the husband, and the
estate. Id.
241
Id. at *3.
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Id. (“The children received the decedent’s interest in the family corporation totaling
$928,500 . . . .”).
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This presents an interesting contrast with Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, in which the court discounted
an agreement made between spouses during an intact marriage. 929 N.E.2d 955, 969 (Mass. 2010).
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partners takes these assumptions into account indirectly, but the primary
reason has to do with bargaining. This Section discusses marital bargains
and bargaining in order to explain why spouses receive the legal treatment
that they do at relationship termination. Understanding the way in which
spousal bargaining leads to increased shareholder protections,
subsequently, provides a fresh perspective through which to understand
why certain corporate family members should also receive enhanced
protections.
1. Excavating the Original Marital Bargain
Before any direct bargaining was routinely allowed between
spousesprior to spouses considering the option of explicit bargaining
about marriage rolesthe contours of a marital bargain were already
present. Marriage law has been defined historically by a standard bargain,
grounded in coverture and premised on a husband’s duty of support and a
wife’s duty to obey and care for her husband. In this classic bargain, as
described by Sir William Blackstone, the “legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband.” 244 Women traded obedience and household labor
for protection and provisioning. The “precise contours of this marital
bargain,” also “evolved over time,” 245 impacted by new developments such
as the right of married women to own property. 246 Nevertheless, the
traditional bargain remained one of support for care work, domestic work,
and sexual relations.
This historical version of the marital bargain meant that law expected
no bargaining from spouses within marriage not only because women had
no bargaining power but also because there was an implicit marital bargain
that women were seen as consenting to at the moment of marriage.247
Family wealth law, outside of the parental bargaining over marriage
settlements in the weeks leading up to a marriage, never expected spouses
to explicitly bargain about earnings and property because a default template
244

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *58.
Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities,
102 VA. L. REV. 79, 81 (2016).
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See Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married
Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEM. 165 (2014).
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Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225,
235 (2011) (“Not only could a married woman not make a contract with her husband, but also her
ability to bargain with the outside world was severely restricted by coverture, in which rights over her
property and the wages she had earned vested in her husband.”). See generally Allison Anna Tait,
Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1269 (2015) (courts presumed an exchange as well as a
unity between spouses and declined, as a general rule, to support a keeping of accounts between
spouses).
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was already assumed to be present and operative, embedded within
coverture rules.
During the last decades of the twentieth century, the marital bargain
began to transform from a relationship of support to one of economic
partnership. No-fault divorce was the spur because this new regulatory
regime necessitated a new theory of asset distribution at divorceone not
premised on faultand equitable distribution became the new standard
bearer. Equitable distribution helped provision divorcing housewives who
were vulnerable because of the traditional income and wealth asymmetries
that the structure of marriage produced. Courts stressed a couple’s
economic partnership in order to reach equal asset division, and, slowly but
surely, the legal discourse around marriage settled on the idea of economic
partnership. 248 Equitable distribution and economic partnership rewrote the
marital bargainor, at the very least, changed the terms of discourse.
Nevertheless, the default marital bargain was still traceable. Even within
the framework of economic partnership, marriage still entailed an exchange
of household work and domestic contributions for the guarantee of
financial remuneration in the event of divorce.
Whether the marital bargain is premised on older theories of support
or newer ones of partnership, then, the result is the same: marriage law
contains a default bargain that all other bargains, including pre- and
postnuptial agreements, map over or onto. This implicitly sets forth ex ante
limits, constructing the parameters of possibility for bargaining spouses.
Moreover, because this implicit bargain is always present at the root of the
legal relationship, spouses are not presumed either to have or to need full
contractual autonomy. Robust bargaining autonomy is not considered
desirable in the marital context and, for similar reasons, would be just as
undesirable in the context of corporate family members.
2. The Unique Nature of Spousal Bargaining
A default marital bargain is in place, then, ordering legal
understandings and expectation of marriage like the invisible hand, guiding
individual and collective choices. Nevertheless, spouses also bargain on
their own to bring clarity to shadow spots in the original bargain or to
circumvent the default rules. In fact, most spouses are active bargainers
who bargain informally on a regular basis.
Spouses bargain daily over the demands of running a household,
keeping up with social obligations, and negotiating career paths. Someone
has to pay the cable bill, buy groceries, and make appointments with the

248

Id. at 1250–60.
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dentist and doctor. 249 One spouse’s new job may involve negotiating a
move with the other spouse, who may be forced not only to relocate but
also to change jobs. 250 Childcare, in particular, routinely requires
scheduling flexibility and negotiation. Spouses, therefore, bargain to meet
the immediate demands of a shared life.251
Couples also bargain formally when entering into and exiting from
marriage. Antenuptial agreements have become increasingly routine,
especially among high-wealth couples, and couples bargain over anything
and everything in these agreements. 252 Most commonly, couples bargain
before marriage about how certain assets will be characterized if they
divorce, usually exempting specific assets from becoming marital
property. 253 Frequently, couples bargain over the elective share as well,
with the wife giving up her right to the elective share in return for a
guaranteed financial benefit. But couples also bargain over fidelity,
sometimes inserting “bad boy” clauses that bring penalties. Couples
stipulate financial rewards that will flow to the wife upon the birth of
children. And, if there is an earning asymmetry, the couple might specify a
regular financial allotment for the nonearning spouse. Couples also bargain
specifically to opt out of the conventional marital bargain: to rewrite gender
roles, change implicit marital expectations, create alternative families, and
clarify personalized family designs. 254 Couples also bargain at relationship
exit over the terms of a divorce. 255 Couples bargain over who retains what
assets, spousal maintenance, and childor even petcustody terms.
The fact that spouses bargain regularly and even vigorously does not,
however, mean that they are free from competing desires and bounded self249

See generally ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT (2003);
Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1414 (2015) (detailing the ways in which women take
on household work even when employed in the paid labor market, thereby taking on an additional
“second shift” of work).
250
See Beth A. Livingston, Bargaining Behind the Scenes: Spousal Negotiation, Labor, and Work–
Family Burnout, 40 J. MGMT 949 (2014).
251
See RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING
POWER 37–65 (1995).
252
Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and
How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 146 (1998).
253
WILLIAM P. STATSKY, FAMILY LAW 108 (6th ed. 2013) (“In premarital agreements, parties
often give up . . . their right to an elective share.”) (emphasis omitted).
254
See MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL & INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE
ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES (2015); MAHONY, supra note 251; see also Case, supra note 247, at 251
(bargaining may “tend to benefit those in couples who have reached and seek enforcement of a bargain
that departs from traditional gender roles”).
255
For an analysis of how gender impacts divorce negotiations, see Tess Wilkinson-Ryan &
Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining,
26 LAW & INEQ. 109 (2008).
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interest. Spouses may, in fact, be the most ubiquitous example of why the
rational actor model is flawed: even though they bargain frequently, they
are compelled by innumerable and varied motives, attachments,
animosities, and desired outcomes. Because of the unique intimacy spouses
share and precisely because of the complicated psychology of marriage,
marriage law has built in protections for bargaining spouses.256 Marriage
law has traditionally presumed that spouses are idiosyncratic bargainers,
understood to suffer from overly bounded rationality because their desired
outcomes are formed by such varied and complex motivations. Unlike in
the corporate context, personal knowledge is not thought to produce
bargaining power. Instead, spouses are considered unlikely to bargain
effectively or fairly because the opportunities for spouses to deploy
psychological and emotional weaponry are too many and the chance of
manipulation too great.257
The rule, therefore, has traditionally been: “Courts in this country
have generally been closed to those who seek judicial enforcement of
bargains or judicial resolution of disputes in an ongoing marriage.” 258
Family law allows bargaining on the margins of marriage—antenuptial and
divorce agreements are acceptable—however bargaining within marriage is
either automatically disallowed or scrutinized with supreme care. 259 This
rule may, in many ways, downplay or ignore the frequent and successful
bargaining in which spouses engage. Nevertheless, the rule correctly
recognizes that all individuals, whether spouses or not, are formed by and
follow personal desires in bargaining and that when the bargaining parties
are intimately connected, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
compartmentalize roles and avoid the professional becoming personal.
Accordingly, corporate spouses benefit from legal protections when
their relationships terminate because legal norms and rules construct

256
Family law might also be seen, from a less optimistic point of view, to discourage marital
bargaining because law continues to think in terms of the fiction of marital unity and consequently
disallows either the appearance or the reality of separate interests within marriage.
257
Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 962−63 (Mass. 2010) (“A marital agreement stands on
a different footing from both a premarital and a separation agreement. Before marriage, the parties have
greater freedom to reject an unsatisfactory premarital contract. A separation agreement, in turn, is
negotiated when a marriage has failed and the spouses ‘intend a permanent separation or marital
dissolution.’ . . . The circumstances surrounding marital agreements in contrast are ‘pregnant with the
opportunity for one party to use the threat of dissolution “to bargain themselves into positions of
advantage.”’” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
§ 7.01(1)(c) (Am. Law Inst. 2002); then quoting Pacelli v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 61 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999))).
258
Case, supra note 247, at 225.
259
Id. at 251.
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corporate spouses as bounded bargainers who will not always be able to
fully or rationally bargain for their own protections.
III. BUILDING CORPORATE FAMILY LAW
Understanding that corporate family members do not bargain in the
way that corporate law expects them to and are, in fact, more akin to
corporate spouses who are bounded bargainers, the subsequent question is
how to protect these corporate actors. This Part suggests paths to begin
building a new corporate family law that will benefit all corporate family
members. To do so, I suggest increasing legal and financial protections for
minority shareholders in closely held corporations that are owned and run
by families. 260 Closely held corporations are defined in a number of ways,
usually by number of shareholders, but they can easily be defined by family
participation as well. A central feature of these corporations, indeed, is that
they are usually family controlled. Reform could be targeted, then, at
family-owned, closely held corporations, and this descriptive requirement
could be written into any statutory solution.261 The following Sections
propose solutions and reforms based both on family law jurisprudence and
an enhanced understanding of the needs of corporate family members.
A. Bringing Family Law into Corporate Law
A first place to look for solutions is divorce and inheritance law.
Many of those rules have relevance in the corporate arena and can provide
useful models for corporate reform. The solutions that follow derive from
family law—both divorce and inheritance law—and braid together rules
from family and corporate law in order to better protect family members
from corporate oppression by improving what happens for these individuals
at corporate exit.
1. Taking Lessons from Divorce Law
Divorce law is, perhaps, the definitive source for rules governing
relationship exit. Divorce courts possess great fluency in managing
260
It is likely that these protections should be extended to family members in various other
organizational forms, like partnerships and LLCs. I reserve that discussion, however, for another time.
261
In the instances in which the shareholders in a closely held corporation are not family members,
they are usually friends who have started a business together or who have decided to go in on a business
venture together. As I mention supra note 25, corporate friends might also and perhaps should also
benefit from these same protections, based on the notion of bounded bargaining. Corporate friends, like
corporate family members, are likely bounded bargainers. Nevertheless, the concept of corporate
friends requires a different and new discussion about line drawing and invites debate over what and
who are friends. It is for this same reason that inheritance law never includes friends in intestacy laws or
anti-lapse laws. Friends may be forever, but they are also notoriously difficult to define and, unlike
family, even more difficult to keep.

48

112:1 (2017)

Corporate Family Law

relationship termination and the allocation of assets that accompanies it.
This Section discusses two ways in which corporate law can look to family
law—in providing buyout as a remedy and in eliminating discounts when
they penalize the minority shareholder—to improve protections for
corporate family members.
a. A Judicial Preference for Buyout
One reform that is already included in the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act is to require fair-value buyout. 262 The Model Act states:
“In a proceeding . . . to dissolve a corporation, the corporation may elect or,
if it fails to elect, one or more shareholders may elect to purchase all shares
owned by the petitioning shareholder at the fair value of the shares.”263 In
this way, dissolution is not the sole remedy available to a minority
shareholder, and the relationship exit can be executed with the least harm to
the company. Currently, a majority of states allow buyout as a remedy;
however, there are notable exceptions including Delaware and Virginia.
Consequently, buyout as a remedy is not guaranteed and great debate still
exists concerning whether or not a mandatory buyout should be available to
minority shareholders.
Looking to divorce law, some form of buyout of shares is the most
common way to deal with the division of corporate shares. The rules
concerning corporate stock distribution at divorce are that stock in a closely
held family corporation can be distributed by the court in a divorce
proceeding in several ways, “including division of the stock, awarding
offsetting property, or cash payments over time.” 264 The majority of courts
underscore that the first option, division of stock, is the least preferable
method of distribution because it necessitates a continued working
relationship between spouses. 265 The other two solutions, which essentially
constitute a buyout, are the more frequent result.
262

At present, a small number of statesincluding Alaska, California, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New York, and North Dakotainclude fair value language in their statutes. See Matheson & Maler,
supra note 37, at 671; Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,” supra note 27, at 309–10
(noting a number of states have “fair value” statutes but that “fair value” is not well defined).
263
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(a) (AM. BAR ASSOC. 2002).
264
Weston v. Weston 773 P.2d 408, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Utah rule is typical of other
states as well.
265
See, e.g., Frandsen v. Frandsen, 564 P.2d 1274, 1275 (Haw. 1977); Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68,
69 (Utah 1981); Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979); Wetzel v. Wetzel, 150 N.W.2d 482, 485
(Wis. 1967). “We agree that, whenever possible, continued joint ownership by divorced spouses of
closely held corporate stock should be avoided, and acknowledge with approval those cases cited by the
defendant which set forth the rationale for that principle.” Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah
1983). Nevertheless, in Savage v. Savage, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that because the varying
valuations were all credible and because “any cash distribution risked doing substantial injustice to one
party . . . . in-kind division of Savage stock was a proper solution.” Id.
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Courts avoid division of stock in order to facilitate a clean break
between the parties. In Smith v. Smith, 266 for example, “[d]espite assigning
a value to [two companies] . . . the court concluded that it could not
determine an ‘accurate accrual value of the stock’ in either corporation and
provided that the stock holdings in these corporations be divided equally
between the parties.” 267 On appeal, both spouses contended that the trial
court had erred by not providing a different exit option.268 The state
supreme court agreed: “We cannot expect divorced parties to continue a
business relationship that will optimize resources and profits”; it was, the
court suggested, “particularly important to avoid creating situations where
the divorced parties remain in joint management of the income producing
property.” 269
Courts also avoid division of shares in order to avoid making one
spouse into a minority shareholder. In McCulloch v. McCulloch, 270 the
Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had erred by
failing to value the corporate shares and subsequently awarding the wife
25% of the shares in the family businesses. On appeal, the state supreme
court observed that assigning stock to the wife rather than some other form
of compensation was incorrect. 271 The court reasoned that, by not placing
value on the companies before assigning the shares, the wife’s minority
share would “likely not be the equivalent of 25 percent of the total value of
the company.” 272 Furthermore, the court observed that the “assignment of
stock in a closely held corporation, which makes one spouse a minority
shareholder, is generally disfavored and should be avoided whenever
possible.” 273
The question, then, in the corporate context is whether a buyout
should be mandatory or just available as a judicial remedy. Some scholars
have proposed that because of the peculiar and precarious position of a
minority shareholder, there should be a statutorily guaranteed buyout.274
These scholars contend that “both involuntary dissolution and its
266

690 A.2d 970 (Me. 1997).
Id. at 971.
268
Id.
269
Id. (quoting Berry v. Berry, 658 A.2d 1097, 1099 (Me. 1995)).
270
69 A.3d 810, 818 (R.I. 2013).
271
Id. at 822.
272
Id.
273
Id. The state supreme court remanded the case for further inquiry. Id. at 830 (“[The trial justice]
should have placed a value on the portions of the two entities that he assigned to each party to ensure
that his distribution of the marital estate was truly equitable.”). Id.
274
See Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,” supra note 27, at 308–10 (discussing the
fair-buyout remedy).
267
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alternatives are costly and ineffectual and that considerations of equity and
efficiency justify permitting the minority to withdraw its investment for
any reason.” 275 A mandatory buyout, however, may prove to be unfair to
the majority shareholder, who could be forced to keep an inflated asset base
in order to execute a buyout at any time. Moreover, this guarantee might
impact the company’s ability to obtain credit or give the minority
shareholder an unfair bargaining chip.276 The third option, and the middle
ground, is to “aggressively encourag[e] courts to grant buyout or
dissolution, not merely where minority shareholders are the victims of the
unfairly prejudicial misuse of control power by majority shareholders, but
also in any circumstances where the minority shareholders are found to be
in deeply embittered or grievously disappointing circumstances.”277 A
judicial preference for buyout as an exit solution not only alleviates undue
burden on the majority shareholder but also favors both equitable
compensation for the minority and as permanence for the corporate
enterprise.
With buyout available as a judicial remedy, minority interests are
compensated and exit is accomplished with the least amount of disruption,
both to the family members involved as well as to the business enterprise.
b. Eliminating the Friends and Family Discount
If fair-value buyout were a required option, 278 helping minority
shareholders receive value for their shares without the total dissolution of
the company, the question then becomesWhat constitutes fair value? 279
Two questions in particular arise. Timing is a significant issue (similar to
some divorce proceedings) because the value of a company can change
dramatically in short time frames. The larger question, however, is whether
or not “fair value” precludes the application of discounts.
With closely held companies, a discount for lack of marketability is
often applied when valuing shares because of the relative difficulty of
converting the shares to cash. Relatedly, a discount is also applied when
valuing the shares of a minority shareholder because of the difficulty in

275

Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 35, at 6.
For objections to the mandatory buyout proposal, see Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied
Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of
Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 70–72 (1982) (arguing against any
assumption that a buyout is painless).
277
Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close Corporation Act and a Proposed Legislative
Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817, 837 (1985).
278
”[S]hareholders may elect to purchase all shares owned by the petitioning shareholder at the fair
value of the shares.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(a) (AM. BAR ASSOC. 2002) (emphasis added).
279
See Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,” supra note 27, at 310–11.
276
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finding buyers who are willing to purchase such shares. 280 In corporate
cases, discounts are routinely applied in buyout situations even when fairvalue statutes exist, and minority shareholders are consequently penalized
for ownership of shares that are difficult to both value and sell.
Divorce courts have typically understood the basic fairness of
applying the valuation discounts only when it benefits the “minority” party.
In McCulloch v. McCulloch, for example, the trial court awarded the wife
25% of the two family companies and, speaking to the valuation question
on appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court applied both marketability and
illiquidity discounts.281 Discounts were appropriate, the court stated, not
just because they reflected the lower value of these shares but also because
they prevented the wife’s share of the marital estate from being artificially
inflated in value.282 The court also observed that, “if the trial justice had
awarded [the wife] the cash equivalent of her equitable ownership interest
in the companies, or if he had crafted some other assignment, such
discounts would not be necessary.” 283
In contrast, in Moore v. Moore, 284 when the wife retained ownership of
the company, the court stated: “[W]e find no justification for discounting
the value of Candelabra in this case due to lack of marketability. Because
Wife will retain ownership of Candelabra, we see no legitimate reason to
indulge in the fiction of a marketability discount.” 285 Divorce courts
therefore apply marketability discounts variably in order to protect the
vulnerable spouse, looking at both the equities of dividing the marital estate
as well as the likelihood of share resale.
In the corporate law domain, courts and legislatures should likewise
resist the fiction of share resale and focus instead on equitable
compensation for the minority shareholder. With these guideposts in
sight—and because parties are not seeking to manipulate calculations
pertaining to the marital estate—it may well be that “[m]inority and
marketability discounts have no place in shareholder oppression
280

McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 822–23 (R.I. 2013) (“[A] minority shareholder lacks
control over the company, and therefore, the value of his or her stock is diluted in comparison to that of
a majority shareholder.”).
281
Id. at 822.
282
In a similar situation, a New Jersey court concluded:
We see no reason to reward the spouse who holds title to the shares by allowing him to retain the
value of the entire bloc at a bargain price . . . . Here, allowing the marketability or minority
discounts would unfairly minimize the marital estate to [the wife’s] detriment and is inconsistent
with the concept of equitable distribution.
Brown v. Brown, 792 A.2d 463, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
283
McCulloch, 69 A.3d at 822.
284
779 S.E.2d 533, 551 (S.C. 2015).
285
Id.
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disputes.” 286 To this end, statutes should clarify that fair value means
“enterprise value” rather than fair market value. Similarly, when faced with
“fair value” language, even in the absence of a fair-value statute, courts can
and should eliminate discounts if they serve no purpose other than to
penalize the minority interest.
2. A Parting Gift from Harry Winston
While divorce law is one source of rulemaking expertise, inheritance
law provides another. Inheritance law can offer models for corporate law
with respect to the standards for enhanced fiduciary duty as well as the
intervention of donor intent. The story of the rivalry and prolonged
litigation between Harry Winston’s sons is a good example and provides
lessons for the development of new solutions in corporate law.
Harry Winston, who built the famous Fifth Avenue jewelry company
from the ground up into a multimillion-dollar enterprise and locus of
prestige, had two sons. The sons, Ronald and Bruce, had different
personalities, passions, and aptitudes for work. Harry Winston is reported
as having said: “I have two sons . . . one is a genius and one is a moron.” 287
Because of these differences, Harry Winston planned his estate such that
both sons would receive equal income from the business but Ronald was
made one of the trustees of the trust holding the corporate shares while
Bruce was not. 288
Once Harry Winston and his wife died, Ronald undertook to squeeze
Bruce out of the company. Ronald terminated Bruce’s employment 289 and,
at the same time, continued the corporate policy of not paying out any
dividends. Bruce was left without any ability to extract value from his
shares while Ronald’s salary “steadily increased from $248,000.00 in 1979
to $1,138,000 in 1990,” despite a decline in corporate profitability. 290

286

Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,” supra note 27, at 318; see also Robert C. Art,
supra note 27, at 405 (“Oregon case law is quite clear. Neither a marketability nor a minority discount
should be applied in oppression cases.”).
287
Nina Burleigh, The Trouble with Harry Winston, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 18, 1999),
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/bizfinance/biz/features/1028/index2.html
[https://perma.cc/X29D39ZH]; see also Karen E. Boxx, Too Many Tiaras: Conflicting Fiduciary Duties in the Family-Owned
Business Context, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 233, 268–69 (2012). Ronald was the studious son, graduating from
Harvard with a chemistry degree before going into the family business. Burleigh, supra. Bruce, on the
other hand, did not finish college and preferred sailing and the pursuit of leisure. Id.
288
Burleigh, supra note 287.
289
In re Estate of Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1007 (N.Y. Sur. Court 1995), aff’d sub nom. In re
Winston, 636 N.Y.S.2d 635 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
290
Id. at 1002. During this eleven-year period, the corporation lost money in seven years and
showed a profit in only four. Id.
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Ronald also reorganized stock, over the wishes of the two other trustees
and Bruce, such that Bruce’s stock was rendered valueless. 291
In the Surrogate’s Court, Ronald argued that “his father’s primary
objective [in his will] . . . was to provide a mechanism for the ‘preservation
and perpetuation of the Winston family enterprise’ under Ronald’s
management and control.” 292 Furthermore, any “debilitating effect of an inkind distribution upon the value of Bruce’s half share of the trust and his
corresponding inability to receive income was anticipated by the decedent
as a natural consequence of his estate and business plan.” 293 In other words,
Ronald argued that he was appropriately exercising his best business
judgment in following his father’s wishes.
The court saw matters differently. The court concluded that Harry
Winston had meant for Ronald to run the business but had also clearly
intended to provide equally for the siblings. Consequently, the court stated:
[F]or Ronald to conclude . . . that Harry intended to vest absolute control of
the family enterprise in him for the balance of his career and to subordinate
Bruce’s inheritance to this alleged dominant and paramount intention . . . is
simply not supported by a reasonable construction and interpretation of the
Will. 294

Invoking Ronald’s fiduciary duties as a trustee, the court further stated:
“The fiduciary responsibilities conferred upon Ronald do not evince
Harry’s intent to afford him special treatment, but to the contrary, impose
on Ronald a special fiduciary obligation of fairness and undivided loyalty
in his management of the family business and his dealings with family
members.” 295
Faced with the same pattern of oppressive behavior as in the minority
shareholder oppression cases, the result here was different for two reasons.
First, the fiduciary standard used to evaluate Ronald’s behavior was a trust
law standard that presented a lower bar for breach than corporate fiduciary
duty, especially with respect to self-dealing and conflicted transactions.296

291
Id. at 1003. “This scenario,” one scholar has remarked, was “a classic squeeze-out.” Boxx,
supra note 287, at 272. “Ronald held only 50% of the shares, but his voting power over the trust’s
shares gave him the same power to freeze out Bruce as the extra 1% ownership would have given.” Id.
292
Winston, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 1005.
295
Id. at 1006.
296
Directors, therefore, may have more discretion than trustees to manage the internal operations
of an institution and may be more immune to claims of breach of fiduciary duty. Also, unlike trustees,
directors are not subject to a complete prohibition on self-dealing. See Allison Anna Tait, Publicity
Rules for Public Trusts, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 421, 438–39 (2015); see also Patty
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Traditional fiduciary duty in trust law has also focused on protecting the
best interests of the beneficiary, not necessarily on judging the malfeasance
of the trustee. This lesson is important for family businesses because
business shares are often held and transferred, especially
intergenerationally, through trusts. 297 Furthermore, some scholars have
suggested that this enhanced standard of fiduciary duty be used in minority
oppression cases whenever courts engage in a fiduciary duty analysis.298 As
one commentator has remarked:
By shifting the inquiry from the beneficiary’s best interests to a more limited
focus on the fiduciary’s malfeasance, these [new fiduciary duty] tests provide
greater latitude . . . for corporate fiduciaries to pursue their own interests, and
diminish the power of the law to inspire and enforce high standards of
business ethics. 299

A shift back to the traditional trust law framework in all fiduciary duty
analyses could, therefore, help minority shareholders.
Second, the positive result for Bruce in the Winston case was a
product of the court’s determination that Winston intended to treat his sons
equally, particularly in terms of income. Will construction intervened and
provided the template for asset and income management. Although relevant
primarily for shares held in trust or transferred by bequest, the Winston case
suggests a role in these family business cases for the guidance that comes
from instructional documents such as will and trust instruments. These
documents can serve as evidence of a parent’s desire for an equality norm
to rule distributions and asset allocation among children, as in the Winston
case. More broadly, these documents can provide crucial information about
family governance that may help shape corporate governance in family
businesses. These documents include not only wills and trust instruments
but the family “charters” and “constitutions” that wealth management
advisors commonly suggest families create to guide generational changes
and wealth transfer. 300
Gerstenblith, The Fiduciary Duties of Museum Trustees, 8 COLUM. J. ART & L. 175, 191 (1983)
(discussing the need for museums directors to better understand problems of self-dealing).
297
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1675, 1677 (1990).
298
See, e.g., id.; Robert C. Art, supra note 27, at 372–73.
299
Mitchell, supra note 297, at 1677.
300
See, e.g., BROOKE HARRINGTON, CAPITAL WITHOUT BORDERS: WEALTH MANAGERS AND THE
ONE PERCENT 251 (2016) (“[H]igh-net-worth families create written constitutions to govern
themselves.”); JAMES E. HUGHES JR., FAMILY WEALTH—KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY: HOW FAMILY
MEMBERS AND THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL, AND FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR
GENERATIONS 19 (2004) (“[A] family must form a social compact among its members reflecting its
shared values . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
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Inheritance rules, then, can be instructive in determining a fiduciary
duty standard for family businesses and may also help unearth information
and instructions about a family’s vision for its corporate presence.
B. Statutory Reform for Corporate Families
Apart from family law solutions for corporate law reform, there are
also corporate statutory reforms that state legislatures can enact to better
protect corporate family members based on the specific ways in which
family businesses organize and operate. As discussed in Part I, virtually all
the states have some kind of statutory protection for minority shareholders
on the books, with the notable exception of Delaware. 301 The protections
that these statutes offer range greatly. Statutes differ, for example, with
respect to standard of liability (e.g., reasonable expectations, fiduciary
duty, fraud, and illegality) and what remedies are available. Some states do,
however, understand the predicament of corporate family members subject
to shareholder oppression. These states provide model statutory language
for other states moving forward. 302 In this Section, I suggest several
statutory reforms meant to further bolster protection for corporate family
members.
1. Working for the Family Business
One statutory reform with the potential to benefit corporate family
members in particular entails adding language that protects minority
shareholders not just as shareholders but also as directors, officers, and
employees. The New Jersey statute, for example, provides for relief if
company directors “have acted oppressively or unfairly toward one or more
minority shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, officers,
or employees.” 303 Few other state statutes, however, provide similar
protections. 304
When this language is absent, corporate family members are
vulnerable. For example, in Franchino v. Franchino, a Michigan court
concluded that the minority shareholder oppression statute did not cover
employment termination when a father fired his minority shareholder
301

Matheson & Maler, supra note 37, at 683–84.
States with expansive statutes and model language are: Alaska, California, Illinois, Minnesota,
New Jersey, North Dakota, and Oregon.
303
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son. 305 When the father removed the son from the board of directors and
terminated his employment, the son argued that his removal “constituted
oppression of his rights as a shareholder because he received the bulk of his
share of the corporate profits through his salary and expected to participate
in [the company’s] management.” 306 The court disagreed. The court
observed that the statute “only gives rise to a cause of action in cases where
a minority shareholder suffered oppression in his capacity as a
shareholder.” 307 Other state statutes such as New Jersey’s, the court
mentioned, were drafted in such a way as to protect the rights of not only
shareholders but also “directors, officers, or employees.”308 But not
Michigan’s. Consequently, the court held that the termination, because it
did not implicate the son’s shareholder rights, was not material to a claim
of shareholder oppression.
This type of statutory reform is particularly important because of the
ways in which family businesses typically choose to organize. In family
businesses, as opposed to public corporations, the expectation of
employment is much higher. In these companies, “a more intimate and
intense relationship exists between capital and labor,” 309 and family
members who are shareholders “usually expect employment and a
meaningful role in management.” 310 Moreover, many family
businessesHarry Winston, Inc. includedprefer to compensate family
members as employees rather than paying dividends. 311 The drafters of the
New Jersey statute acknowledged these phenomena directly in the
comments to the 1972 amendments, stating: “These [amendments] reflect
the fact that in a closely held corporation oppressive conduct often takes
the form of freezing-out a minority shareholder by removing him from his
various offices or by substantially diminishing his power or
compensation.” 312
This statutory fix will not, of course, help all employment cases.
Corporate family members will still encounter difficulties overcoming the
at-will presumption inherent in most hiring situations, especially in the
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absence of an employment contract or ample evidence that the family
member had reasonable expectations for continuing employment. Likewise,
when a majority shareholder has a “mixed motive” for terminating the
family member, reinstatement or compensation will likely be an uphill
battle. These problems point to the difficulties of overcoming the business
judgment rule (as well as potential deficiencies in the current understanding
of a corporate family member’s reasonable expectations).
Nevertheless, recognizing the distinctive ways in which family
businesses organize both leadership and labor, legislatures should expand
protections past those already available to shareholders and bring board
leadership and company management into the fold.
2. Reasonable Family Expectations
The most common among reforms has been states adding the
“reasonable expectations” language to their statutes in order to clarify what
approach courts should take and how to evaluate oppression claims. The
reasonable expectations language and standard has, as one scholar
observed, “secured a firm toehold as the basis by which courts determine if
minority shareholders are entitled to relief after dissension arises within a
close corporation.” 313 Currently, approximately twenty states use the
reasonable expectations framework to evaluate minority oppression
claims. 314
Going forward, however, the concept of reasonable expectations needs
to be sharpened. As one scholar has observed: “The Reasonable
Expectations approach depends on the meaning of the word ‘reasonable’
and, therefore, requires a deeper theory of shareholder rights and
obligations.” 315 Courts have already recognized that “shareholders’
expectations in a close corporation differ from shareholders’ expectations
in publicly held corporations and may not always be reflected in articles of
incorporation, bylaws, shareholders’ agreements or other writings.” 316
Taking this inquiry one step further, however, it is equally important to
understand and determine what the reasonable expectations of a family
member are and how they might differ from the reasonable expectations of
any other stakeholder. The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized this
in a leading reasonable expectations case, stating that reasonable
expectations “are to be ascertained by examining the entire history of the
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participants’ relationship.” 317 Understanding family histories and what
family members expect based on those relationships helps to construct a
theory of shareholder rights based on family status and belonging.
One reasonable expectation of corporate family members is
participating in the management and governance of the company. That is to
say, corporate family members expect to have a voice in the company’s
operations. Some courts have recognized this: “[T]he primary expectations
of minority shareholders include an active voice in management of the
corporation and input as an employee.” 318 Family members in particular
may expect to have a voice based on the fact that they have voice in the
family context and that expectation spills over into the workplace. For
these reasons, one scholar has suggested a “voice-based framework” for
evaluating minority oppression claims, suggesting that when these
shareholders are stripped of the opportunity to have a voice in the company
that their oppression claims should receive increased scrutiny. 319
Similarly, many corporate family members expect to benefit from
some type of employment in the family business. Family members help
build businesses together, they inherit businesses, and they help out as
needed in the collective endeavor. Family businesses often thrive because
of the willingness of family members to devote time and energy to the
enterprise. Accordingly, “[p]articipants often expect to participate in
management and that their contribution will be recognized in the form of
salary even though those matters are not contained in any written
document.” 320 Moreover, because of the common practice in family
businesses of not paying dividends and relying on salary to compensate
corporate family members, employment takes on increased relevance. In
some cases, with Harry Winston and his sons for example, both sons were
on the payroll even though one son was not expected to contribute to the
company in the same way as the other. Bruce Winston’s salary was his
benefit, his dividend, his monthly allotment. Employment in the family
businesses takes on many meanings and serves multiple purposes.
Consequently, lifetime employment may be a reasonable expectation; some
form of employment may be a reasonable expectation; and, most
importantly, it is likely that these expectations will not be recorded in a

317

Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983).
Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 33, at 1234 n.132 (quoting Pedro v. Pedro,
463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)).
319
Id. at 1241–42.
320
Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 34, at 214.
318

59

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

written agreement in family businesses where the foundation is built on
preexisting relationships of trust and understanding. 321
Ultimately, corporate family members expect to be able to extract
value of some kind and in some manner from their shares. Whether through
inclusion in governance or on the payroll, corporate family members expect
to be a part of not only the family but also the corporation.
CONCLUSION
Legal norms of bargaining embedded in corporate law expect that
self-interest and the desire to self-protect will inform the bargaining
practices of corporate actors and that these individuals will behave as
rational actors. And yet, corporate family members, who populate the
majority of businesses, do not bargain the way that corporate law expects.
Where does that leave siblings, cousins, children, in-laws, and
steprelations? This absence of protections for a particularly vulnerable
sector of corporate actors has led to unwelcome results: “Unfair treatment
of holders of minority interests in family companies and other closely held
corporations by persons in control of those corporations is so widespread
that it is a national business scandal.” 322 There is, however, a model for
asset division at relationship termination that provides financial and legal
protections to vulnerable parties based on an alternate understanding of
bargaining: family wealth law. Both divorce law and inheritance law
safeguard vulnerable spouses when marriage ends, guaranteeing financial
benefits and entitlements, because marriage law considers spouses to be
overly bounded bargainers. Taking lessons from family wealth law, then,
corporate law can learn how to better treat and accommodate corporate
family members. Ultimately, weaving together corporate and family law
will benefit the millions of happy and unhappy families alike who build
organizations, take risks, follow inspiration, and seek fulfillment in the
family business.
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